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Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 141 flight training organizations 
are actively pursuing ways to increase operational safety by introducing advanced risk 
assessment and decision-making techniques. The purpose of the dissertation was to create 
and validate a safety performance decision-making tool to transform a reactive safety 
model into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool, specific to large, 
collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, to increase safety and aid 
in operational decision-making. The validated safety decision-making tool uses what-if 
scenarios to assess how changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall 
level of operational risk within an organization’s flight department.  
Utilizing SPIs determined to be most indicative of flight risk within large, 
collegiate flight training organizations, a predictive, safety performance decision-making 
tool was developed utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. In a high-risk system beset with 
uncertainty, applying Monte Carlo simulation addresses the need to accommodate 
uncontrollable inputs into the model in a manner that enables the model to produce 
meaningful output data. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the 
non-statistical model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, & 
v 
Dickson (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, including 
the SPIs, as the foundation to develop the safety performance decision-making tool. 
The probability distributions of the uncontrollable inputs were drawn from a 
sample of operational data from September 2017 to September 2019 from a large, 
collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States. 
The study conducted simulation runs based on true operational ranges to simulate the 
operating conditions possible within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations with varying levels of controllable resources including personnel (Aviation 
Maintenance Technicians and Instructor Pilots) and expenditures (active flight students 
and available aircraft).  
The study compared the output from three different Verification Scenarios—each 
using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random numbers for the 
uncontrollable inputs. ANOVA testing indicated no significant differences appeared 
among the three different groups, indicating the results are statistically reliable.  
Four What-if Scenarios were conducted by manipulating the controllable inputs. 
Mean probability was the key output and represents the forecasted level of operational 
risk on a standardized 0-5 risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage 
and Related Impact, and an Overall Risk Score. Results indicate the lowest Overall Risk 
Score occurred when the level of personnel was high yet expenditures were moderate. 
Changes to the controllable inputs are reflected by variations to the outputs 
demonstrating the utility and potential for the safety performance decision-making tool. 
The outputs could be utilized by safety personnel and administrators to make more 
informed safety-related decisions without expending unnecessary resources. The model 
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could be adapted for use in any CFR Part 141 flight training organization with data 
collection capabilities and an SMS by modifying the input value probability distributions 
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A CFR Part 141 organization can be defined as a pilot training school certified 
under the specifications defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2017). As defined in Advisory Circular 141-1B, academic institutions may offer aviation-
related degrees and pilot training under CFR Part 141; CFR Part 141 flight schools have 
the option to utilize a wider variety of training tools; although, dedicated flight training 
facilities, qualified flight instructors, and FAA-approved course curricula are still 
required (FAA, 2017).  
Per Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020), a large 
CFR Part 141 could be defined as a pilot training school operating under Title 14 CFR 
Part 141 with the following criteria: 
• At least 500 student pilots 
• A fleet of at least 50 aircraft with the integrated flight instrument system 
capabilities 
• A Flight Data Monitoring system with data collection 
• A scheduling system 
• An active and robust Safety Management System (SMS) 
The complexity of many aviation accidents and incidents combined with rapid 
technological progress has left traditional bottom-up and top-down system safety 
assessment techniques outdated and inadequate (Dakwat & Villani, 2018; Dekker, 2011; 
Stringfellow, Leveson, & Owens, 2010). A major limitation of traditional safety 
2 
 
assessment techniques is the challenge of considering all potential risks that may arise 
from multiple variables interacting together (Dakwat & Villani, 2018). Mitigative actions 
based on the analyses of previous accidents and incidents are both reactive and 
insufficient to further the progress of proactive safety management (ICAO, 2013). 
Additionally, the absence of accidents and incidents within CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations does not assume operations are functioning at the optimum level of safety 
(Adjekum, 2014; Cassens, 2010; Keller, 2015; Mendonca & Carney, 2017). A modern 
approach to safety management includes proactively addressing safety risks rather than 
relying on inspections and remedial actions.  
The complex, high-risk nature of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations 
grants particular susceptibility to risk, potentially leading to a series of systematic 
failures. This drift into failure occurs through the slow normalization risk, occurring as an 
incremental deterioration of safe operating conditions propelled by organizational 
failures, misunderstood technology, and social influences (Dekker, 2011).  
To avoid the process of drifting into failure, organizations are developing ways to 
increase their level of safety by incorporating advanced risk assessment and decision-
making techniques to strengthen the risk management element of the organization’s SMS 
(Ale, Bellamy, Cooke, Goossens, Hale, Roelen, & Smith, 2006). Simulation modeling 
techniques are becoming more widely utilized in complex, high-risk systems across 
various domains to optimize the safety assessment process (Blair, 2017; Chen & Jing, 
2016; Gunduz, Birgonul, & Ozdemir, 2017; Hadjimichael, 2009; Stonesifer, Calkin, 
Thompson, & Kaiden, 2014). SPIs are useful for observing and monitoring known risks, 
as well as detecting future risks to elicit corrective action before an adverse event 
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occurring. SPIs play a valuable role within an organization’s SMS by enabling 
performance-based safety management while supporting the organization’s unique safety 
objectives (Pierobon, 2016).  
However, existing SPIs, although useful in measuring the effectiveness of the 
organization’s SMS, are incapable of providing a true predictive approach to safety 
decision-making, as the data collected to feed into the SPIs are based on events, 
instances, and operations that have already occurred (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, & 
Licu, 2019). Thus, any responses or corrective action made based on these data findings 
is a retroactive approach to safety. The use of what-if scenarios via simulation allows for 
an in-depth look at interactions within the system and assesses the impact of a change to 
the system before any changes take place, rather than retrospectively assessing the effects 
of a change. Further research is needed to transform SPIs into predictive safety decision-
making tools capable of taking proactive safety one step further by modeling the potential 
of the system without compromising resources. 
Statement of the Problem 
Traditionally, the aviation industry has focused on the utilization of historical 
events, such as accident data, or those indicators of safety that are clearly measurable 
(Oswald, Zhang, Lingard, Payam, & Tiendung, 2018). However, safety monitoring based 
on relevant, operational SPIs is still a reactive approach to safety monitoring backed by 
linear reasoning; whereas the aviation risk assessment process must continually evolve 
and improve by considering new approaches to safety monitoring and decision-making 
that provides greater insight into why accidents occur and how safety is best achieved. 
Domain-specific SPIs provide a one-size-fits-all approach to safety monitoring, whereas 
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forecasting models provide safety personnel with the ability to foresee how changes to 
various operating conditions impact the overall safety of the system pertinent to their 
particular operation (Hadjimichael, 2009). 
Further research is needed within the industry to transform reactive safety models 
based on SPIs into safety decision-making tools, capable of handling the predictive 
uncertainty inherent to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations while incorporating the 
use of what-if scenarios, to evaluate how modifying the controllable input variables 
impact the safety and efficiency of the complex system as a whole. A safety decision-
making tool, particular to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations yet 
adaptable to accommodate any flight training organization with data acquisition 
capabilities and an active SMS, would not only allow for a more proactive approach to 
safety but could also assist those in administrative roles with critical decision-making. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of the research was to create and validate a safety performance 
decision-making tool to transform a non-statistical model composed of 12 SPIs 
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to be 
most indicative of flight risk specific to 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations into 
a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. The model uses what-if scenarios 
to evaluate how changing controllable input variables affect the level of operational risk 
within the system, portrayed within the model as the risk score outputs. 
The validated model will utilize what-if scenarios to assess how changes to the 
controllable input variables influence the overall level of risk within the organization’s 
flight department and various other departments.  
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The current research utilized the SPIs drawn from the non-statistical SPI model 
developed by Anderson et al. (2020), as these SPIs have been found to be most indicative 
of operational flight risk for a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Anderson et 
al. (2020) created and validated a non-statistical model encompassing SPIs from both 
flight and maintenance operations and their related formulae drawn from a two-year 
sample of operational flight and maintenance data. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
the SPIs from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were used as 
the foundation to develop a safety performance decision-making tool based on the input 
variables for the chosen SPIs. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and run to enable 
the SPI model to handle uncertainty in some of the key, influential variables. 
Significance of the Study 
The extant literature indicated a deficit of predictive, safety performance decision-
making tools specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations; 
therefore, this research fills an operational need within the industry. The study also 
extends the research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) by expanding the non-statistical 
model into a safety performance decision-making tool utilizing Monte Carlo simulation 
to improve the accuracy and robustness of the flight training organization’s SMS. 
The research also improves the current understanding of the factors most 
substantially contributing to flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations. As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be used by 
the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization to 
rationalize new hires, technology acquisitions, and other safety-related initiatives by 
modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs, without the risk 
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associated with actually expending the organization’s resources. The model could also be 
modified for applicable use by any flight training organization with data acquisition 
capabilities and an operational SMS.  
Theoretically significant, the model provides a mechanism for expanding the 
breadth of knowledge related to optimizing resources from both flight and maintenance 
operations to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. 
Further, a thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of going 
from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety performance decision-making tools with 
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight 
training operations. The research fills this gap by providing a validated safety decision-
making tool, specific to CFR Part 141 operations, to further move the needle in the 
direction of proactive, rather than reactive, aviation safety assessment techniques.  
The model created within this dissertation has a high level of generalizability, as 
the model could be adapted for use in any large CFR Part 141 flight training organization 
with data collection capabilities and an active SMS. This dissertation describes the 
process of transforming a reactive safety model composed of SPIs into a safety 
performance decision-making tool; thus, a 14 CFR flight training organization could 
utilize its own unique SPIs by determining the probability distributions of the 
uncontrollable input variables, further enhancing the generalizability of the safety 
performance decision-making tool. Providing large, CFR Part 141flight training 
organizations with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk management 
component of the organization’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive approach to 
safety by providing insight into the impact changes to operating conditions may have on 
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the safety of the overall operation. The ability to forecast operating conditions using 
Monte Carlo simulation will allow CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to make 
better informed safety-related decisions while optimizing efficiency without 
compromising safety.  
Research Question  
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, 
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety 
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios? 
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk 
score? 
Delimitations 
The model is designed to measure the potential for increased or decreased flight 
risk for large, collegiate flight training programs within the United States. The displayed 
level of risk associated with monthly operating conditions can be used to make safety-
related decisions by organizational safety personnel. The model does not measure 
occupational risks, such as injuries incurred in the maintenance hangar or personal slips, 
trips, and falls. The model does not measure cases of gross negligence, such as the willful 
disregard of standard operating procedures unless such occurrences are deemed to be 
systemic in nature. Security threats, including suicide and sabotage, are also not 
considered. Human performance state measurements were excluded from the analysis. 
Although there are some factors not covered in the study, these delimitations do not 
affect the rigor of the model as the SPIs utilized were chosen by Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) to be most appropriate in gauging flight risk for large, collegiate flight training 
8 
 
operations within the United States (Anderson et al., 2020). The model is also highly 
adaptable and could be modified to include the delimitations not considered within the 
research, assuming the organization has the necessary data available.  
Limitations and Assumptions 
The research conducted for the purpose of this dissertation was limited to the 
creation and validation of a safety performance decision-making tool utilizing Monte 
Carlo simulation to transform a non-statistical model composed of the ten SPIs 
determined by Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decision-
making tool capable of running what-if scenarios to evaluate how changing controllable 
input variables within the system affect the overall level of operational risk, portrayed 
within the model as the overall risk score output. The variables used in this model are 
limited to those determined to be most useful in measuring flight risk in a large, 
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization by SMEs in flight and maintenance 
operations (Anderson et al., 2020). Additionally, the model could easily be adapted to 
accommodate other flight training organizations with data collection capabilities and an 
operational SMS. 
Per Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020), the model 
assumes a large CFR Part 141, defined as a pilot training school operating under Title 14 
CFR Part 141, possesses the following operational criteria:  
• At least 500 student pilots 
• A fleet of at least 50 aircraft with integrated flight instrument system 
capabilities 
• A Flight Data Monitoring system with data collection 
9 
 
• A scheduling system 
• A robust and active Safety Management System 
This assumption reflects the current state of most large CFR Part 141 flight 
training operations.  
 Summary 
High-risk organizations, such as CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, are 
actively pursuing ways to increase their level of safety by incorporating improved risk 
assessment and decision-making techniques designed as fundamental parts within the 
system (Ale, Bellamy, Cooke, Goossens, Hale, Roelen, & Smith, 2006). Simulation 
modeling techniques are becoming more widely utilized in complex, high-risk systems 
across various domains to optimize the safety assessment process (Blair, 2017; Chen & 
Jing, 2016, Gunduz, Birgonul, & Ozdemir, 2017; Hadjimichael, 2009; Stonesifer, Calkin, 
Thompson, & Kaiden, 2014). However, existing SPIs, although useful in measuring the 
effectiveness of the organization’s SMS, are incapable of providing a true predictive 
approach to safety decision-making (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019). 
Aviation safety must continue to improve by considering new approaches to safety 
monitoring and decision-making that provide greater insight into why accidents occur and 
how safety is best achieved.  
A safety decision-making tool, particular to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations yet adaptable to accommodate any flight training organization with 
data acquisition capabilities and an operational SMS, would allow for a more proactive 
approach to safety by assisting those in administrative roles with critical decision-
making. Thus, the purpose of the research is to create and validate a safety performance 
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decision-making tool based on a non-statistical risk assessment model, or SPI model, 
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to 
represent flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. 
The validated model utilizes what-if scenarios to assess how modifying the controllable 
input variables impacts the overall level of risk within the organization’s flight 
department and various other departments. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and 
run to enable the SPI model to handle uncertainty in some of the key, influential 
variables. 
In terms of significance, the extant literature indicated a deficit of predictive, 
safety performance decision-making tools specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations; therefore, this research fills an operational need within the 
industry. Additionally, the research enhances the depth of understanding of the factors 
most substantially contributing to flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations, thus advancing flight safety. As a safety decision-making tool, the 
model could also be used by the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 
flight training organization to rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safety-
related enterprises by modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable 
inputs, without the risk associated with actually expending the organization’s resources. 
The purpose of the research is to create and validate a safety performance decision-
making tool to transform a nonstatistical model composed of domain-specific SPIs into a 
safety decision-making tool adaptable for use in any flight training organization with data 
gathering capabilities and an operational SMS. Additionally, the model provides a 
mechanism for expanding the breadth of knowledge related to optimizing resources from 
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both flight and maintenance operations to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations. Providing large, CFR Part 141flight training organizations 
with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk management element of the 
organization’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive approach to safety by providing 
insight into the impact changes to operating conditions may have on the safety of the 
overall operation. 
Definitions of Terms 
14 CFR Part 141 This part prescribes the requirements for issuing 
pilot school certificates, provisional pilot school 
certificates, and associated ratings, and the general 
operating rules applicable to a holder of a certificate 
or rating issued under this part (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2017). 
Flight Data Monitoring The analysis of flight data which allows safety 
managers to identify trends and fully investigate the 
circumstances behind events flagged (EASA, 2016). 
Logistical Delay Time The time from when a flight crew reports an aircraft 
as “down for maintenance” to the time the 
maintenance personnel opens a work order in order 
to address the discrepancy (Anderson et al., 2020). 
Monte Carlo Simulation A mathematical technique that uses randomly 
generated values for uncontrollable variables to 
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model risk or uncertainty in a certain system (Dunn 
& Schultis, 2011). 
Occurrences Accidents or incidents. 
Safety Culture The attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that 
employees share concerning safety in the workplace 
(Cox & Cox, 1991). 
Safety Management System SMS is the formal, top-down, organization-wide 
approach to managing safety risk and assuring the 
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes 
systematic procedures, practices, and policies for 
the management of safety risks (FAA Order 
8000.369). 
Safety Performance Indicator A data-based parameter used for monitoring and 
assessing performance (ICAO, 2013b). 
List of Acronyms 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 




GSA Generalized Sensitivity Analysis 
MX Maintenance 
NAC No Aircraft Available 
NMAC Near Mid-Air Collision 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
RPM Revolutions Per Minute 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SMS Safety Management Systems 
SPI Safety Performance Indicator 





REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This chapter describes the present literature surrounding flight safety for CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations; safety performance monitoring and measurement; 
justification surrounding the need for predictive rather than reactive safety monitoring; 
justification for the use of Monte Carlo simulation methods; and a detailed description of 
the theoretical foundation driving the research. 
Flight Safety for CFR Part 141 Flight Training Organizations  
Within the United States, flight training is administered under the oversight of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) according to the federal regulations outlined in 
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 61, 141, or 142 (FAA, 2016). 14 
CFR Part 141 flights schools are certified by the FAA and must meet strict standards to 
ensure optimal safety with requirements for personnel, aircraft, facilities, operational 
rules, and curriculum, allowing these organizations to train pilots more efficiently by 
reducing the flight hour requirements (Mendonca & Carney, 2017).  
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) released the Safety 
Management Annex (Annex 19) in 2013, requiring participating ICAO member states to 
launch a State Safety Program (SSP) and implement an SMS (ICAO, 2013b). SMS 
provides CFR Part 141 flight training organizations with the ability to identify and 
mitigate safety risks before an accident occurring (Chen & Chen, 2014).  
The Safety Risk Management element of the SMS is of particular importance, as 
flight training is inherently a high-risk activity (Cassens, 2015). Management and safety 
personnel within a CFR Part 141 are constantly making decisions on risk acceptability; 
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therefore, safety efforts must focus on the hazards posing the greatest risk to safe 
operations (Lu, 2016). The hazard identification process should encompass proactive, 
reactive, and predictive safety data collection techniques and approaches (ICAO, 2013b).  
The severity of aircraft accidents is a particularly challenging variable to 
anticipate and predict (Bastos, 2005, Mendonca & Carney, 2017). Thus, risk analysis 
techniques, such as the use of risk matrices, for flight schools must take into 
consideration the pertinent safety attributes of the organization, including its safety 
culture, specific operational conditions, and the applicable safety standards (Mendonca & 
Carney, 2017). However, the safety effort of a 14 CFR Part 141 flight school will not 
succeed exclusively by adherence to standard operating procedures and company policy 
(ICAO, 2013b). Rather, SMS encourages taking a proactive approach to safety by 
continuing to develop and adapt to the safety risk management process. Introducing novel 
techniques to the safety assessment process beyond reactive risk matrices, such as a 
predictive safety decision-making tool, will transform the risk assessment process from 
reactive to predictive with very little risk involved.  
Safety Performance Monitoring  
Mitigative actions based on the analyses of previous accidents and incidents are 
both reactive and insufficient to further the progress of proactive safety management 
(ICAO, 2013). Additionally, the absence of accidents and incidents within CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations does not assume operations are functioning at the optimum 
level of safety (Adjekum, 2014; Cassens, 2010; Keller, 2015; Mendonca & Carney, 
2017). A modern approach to safety management includes proactively addressing safety 
risks rather than relying on inspections and remedial actions.  
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With the introduction and requirement of an SMS, the focus is shifting from 
archaic forms of reactive data collection and analysis toward approaches and techniques 
that bolster and improve the effectiveness of the organization’s SMS. A vital portion of 
this process includes the development and implementation of safety performance 
indicators (SPIs). ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual, and ICAO Annex 19 
define an SPI as a data-driven safety constraint used for observing and evaluating an 
organization’s safety performance. SPIs are used to monitor and mitigate known safety 
risks to elicit corrective action before an adverse event occurring. Pierobon, 2016). 
(Pierobon, 2016). 
Safety performance indicators. Quantitative performance indicators must be 
identified to achieve optimal safety within the organization. SPIs allow for the formation, 
execution, and review of safety policies within an organization (Reiman & Pietikäinen, 
2010). Ensuring the SPIs meet the organization’s predetermined safety goals has posed 
one of the greatest challenges to the development of a performance algorithm with risk 
prediction capabilities (Janicak, 2015). Thus, the particular safety requirements of the 
organization must be identified and prioritized throughout the process as pertinent SPIs 
are selected (Blair, 2017). 
SPIs have been developed and utilized to improve the risk assessment process of 
various high-risk domains, including the aviation industry. Hadjimichael (2009) 
published a model founded on operational SPIs airlines can utilize to assess operational 
risk (Hadjimichael, 2009). Netjasov, Crnogorac, and Pavlović (2019) proposed a conflict 
risk assessment model composed of a set of seven SPIs specific to the Air Traffic 
Management system safety. Domain-specific SPIs have been useful in improving safety 
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within the civil aviation domain as well (Chen and Li, 2016). Additionally, 
Panagopoulos, Atkin, and Sikora (2017) proposed a framework proposing how 
organizations could use SPIs for root-cause analysis of safety considerations. Findings 
exemplify the usefulness of SPIs in providing insight into the operating conditions of the 
organization as a whole.  
Existing methods for determining and measuring SPIs. Effective safety 
management requires thoughtful consideration of the system and the processes driving 
the system; this cannot be achieved without some form of measurement (Safety 
Management International Collaboration Group, 2013). Rather than selecting SPIs based 
on convenience, SPIs must be selected with consideration given to the feedback required 
to ensure the organization’s requirements for safety management can be effectively 
evaluated. The selection of SPIs can be determined through a systems analysis based on 
safety audit results (Jackman, 2018).  
Focus groups utilizing SMEs are another approach to determining the most 
relevant SPIs (Anderson et al., 2020). The focus groups could also be used to develop the 
algorithms for each SPI and provide useful feedback on the selected SPIs. The use of 
focus groups over mathematical methods presents many advantages. For example, the use 
of focus groups is relatively inexpensive. The facilitated discussion process utilized to 
elicit information from focus groups allows expert participants to build upon each other’s 
responses; this is useful for needs assessments and evaluation purposes (Leung & 
Savithiri, 2009). Focus groups also allow researchers to obtain more information from 
verbal, candid responses than may be obtained via survey methods. However, the focus 
group methodology is not without limitations. Focus groups rely heavily on facilitated 
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discussion to produce results emphasizing the critical of the facilitator’s skills as a 
moderator. Finally, the use of focus groups makes the findings more difficult to 
generalize to the larger population due to the inherent weakness of the focus group 
selection process (Leung & Savithiri, 2009).  
Forecasting to improve safety outcomes. Aviation safety has been managed 
based on analyzing accidents and incidents after they have already occurred. Although 
this strategy has allowed the industry to make strides in improving safety, a major 
drawback is the reactive nature of this approach; as, safety analysis based on hindsight 
has restricted the process to primarily focusing on innately negative aspects, such as 
errors and failures within the system (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019). 
Rather, the cyclical approach of measuring, analyzing, and providing feedback through a 
robust SMS has the potential to provide a more holistic, data-driven approach to safety 
monitoring. Thus, rather than focusing solely on historical events or reports monitoring 
should take a more proactive approach by assessing the various components of the 
system and how they contribute to the functioning of the system as a whole. This could 
be accomplished by incorporating forecasting techniques into the safety risk management 
element of an organization’s SMS to aid in further understanding the performance 
variability that occurs within complex systems like aviation.  
Traditionally, organized institutions have been relatively resistant to change 
(Jepperson, 1991; Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). As organizations adhere to institutional 
standards, such as those prescribed by the FAA under CFR Part 141 operating conditions, 
safety monitoring practices could become increasingly taken-for-granted leading to 
problems within the operation (Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). In high-hazard industries, 
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this lack of adaptability can undermine organizational safety. Despite statistically high 
safety rates within the aviation domain, occurrences continue to take place. Researchers 
argue that a proactive, systematic analysis of safety risk management utilizing modern 
techniques, such as forecasting, could aid in evolving an industry that has been 
traditionally reactive to one that is proactive in its risk assessment process (Dyhrberg & 
Jensen, 2004; Insua, Alfaro, Gomez, Hernandez-Coronado, & Bernal, 2019; Verweijen & 
Lauche, 2019).  
Although risk matrices have been able to provide qualitative assessments of risk 
on an ordinal scale, risk matrices provide little insight into the consequences of various 
choices made by the organization and how these consequences impact the system as a 
whole. Rather, forecasting models provide sophisticated methods to assess aviation safety 
occurrence outcomes to bolster an aviation organization’s safety risk management 
practices (Insua et al., 2019). Further, forecasting models could be utilized for decision-
making purposes by aviation authorities, insurance companies, aviation operators, 
aviation companies, and aviation training facilities (Insua et al., 2019). 
Monte Carlo Simulation   
Monte Carlo simulation provides a useful methodology to propagate uncertainties 
further evolving reactive safety models and indices into innovative and predictive models 
useful for forecasting safety performance (Hacura, Jadamus-Hacura, & Kocot, 2001). 
Monte Carlo methods use repeated random sampling to estimate the many potential 
outcomes that cannot be determined with certainty. This is accomplished by modeling 
ranges of potential values where uncertainty exists by analyzing the combination of 
outputs produced by the model. Thus, the outputs provide a range of possible outcomes 
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as well as a probability density curve used to determine outcome frequency. Monte Carlo 
simulation is particularly useful for modeling complex systems where uncertainty exists 
to assess the impact of risk. Monte Carlo methods have led to several innovative 
improvements in various fields such as physics, game theory, finance, maritime, nuclear, 
and aviation (Hacura, Jadamus-Hacura, & Kocot, 2001).  
The selection of either analytical (e.g. point estimate methods) or simulation 
methods (e.g. Monte Carlo simulation) will be shaped by the following considerations 
(Safety and Reliability Society, n. d., p. 3): 
• Complexity of the system  
• Scope 
• Accuracy 
• Future development 
• Application 
Advantages of Monte Carlo simulation. According to Stolzer and Goglia 
(2015), Monte Carlo methods have many appealing characteristics over point estimate 
methods. Monte Carlo simulation methods provide researchers with more valuable 
information than point estimate methods; account for inherent uncertainties; and provide 
the location of any specific risk estimate allowing for a level of risk to be selected within 
the model that corresponds to the desired level of risk protection (Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015). From a research perspective, the process of building the simulation can also 
enhance the depth of understanding of the true system. Monte Carlo methods can be used 
for sensitivity analysis and system optimization without impacting the real system (Spall, 
2003). Using Monte Carlo methods allows for improved control over experimental 
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conditions within the modeled system. Finally, researchers can either compress or expand 
time within the model, something not possible working within the limitations of the real 
system (Spall, 2003).   
The usefulness of Monte Carlo methods is echoed by Faghih-Roohi, Xie, and Ng 
(2014), who used Monte Carlo simulation as an analytical approach to accident risk 
modeling in the maritime environment. Faghih-Roohi et al. (2014) support Monte Carlo 
simulation applications for risk modeling due to the probabilistic attributes associated 
with risk. Basic statistics, such as summary statistics or accident rates, are not adequate 
for long-term risk prediction, further testifying the usefulness of Monte Carlo methods to 
evaluate risk amidst extensive uncertainties (Faghih-Roohi et al., 2014).  
Disadvantages of Monte Carlo simulation. However, simulating the real system 
using Monte Carlo methods does pose several disadvantages. For example, depending on 
the commercial simulation software packages used, it may be very costly and time-
consuming to build a simulation. Further, Monte Carlo simulation relies on random 
number generation to solve deterministic problems; therefore, it is possible that a 
simulation could be stretched beyond the limits of credibility influencing the validity of 
the model when using commercially-sold software packages due to their lack of 
consideration of the underlying assumptions and limitations determined by the researcher 
(Spall, 2003). Another potential disadvantage is that Monte Carlo simulation provides 
several, perhaps millions, of runs at given input values, whereas analytical solutions 
provide exact values (Spall, 2003).  
Monte Carlo process and tools. Monte Carlo simulations perform risk analysis 
in complex systems by creating a model of potential results by using probability 
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distributions for any variable within the model that has inherent uncertainty. Evaluating 
the outputs of probability distributions allows for a much more realistic method of 
describing uncertainty. The fundamental steps of conducting a Monte Carlo simulation 
are as follows: 
1. Define the problem and simulation features 
2. Identify the key components and variables within the model 
3. Define input parameters, including probability distributions and equations, for 
each variable 
4. Define simulation scenarios 
5. Select control values that will be manipulated 
6. Run the simulation with a predetermined amount of trials (e.g. 1,000 trials) 
7. Analyze the results of the output tables using both descriptive statistics and 
sensitivity analysis to test edge cases 
8. Either return to Step 4 and redefine the next scenario or choose to complete 
the simulation at this point (Ayres, Schmutte, & Stanfield, 2017) 
A computer is required to run Monte Carlo simulations. In addition to a basic PC 
spreadsheet, various probabilistic simulation platform software exists to run Monte Carlo 
simulations, such as Analytica by Lumina Decision Systems. Analytica is software for 
developing and evaluating quantitative decision models for modeling risk and 
uncertainty.  
Monte Carlo applications in aviation research. Safety performance assessment, 
based on advanced risk assessment methodologies, is a pressing challenge within the air 
transport and training sector (Di Gravio, Mancini, Patriarca, & Costantino, 2015). 
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Historically, the aviation domain has used simple metrics such as accident rates to gauge 
safety performance; however, reactive metrics are not representative of the level of safety 
present across the various facets of the system (Di Gravio et al., 2015). 
The FAA and the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission have 
identified shared performance indicators to monitor safety by proposing a standard 
occurrence reporting and assessment plan defined under ESARR 2 Appendix A and B 
(EUROCONTROL, 2009). ESARR 2 Appendix A and B outlines the process of 
collecting and recording the information elicited from safety occurrence reports. This 
plan was developed based on James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Accident 
Causation, which relates organizational failures to an alignment of metaphoric “holes” or 
weaknesses in the system so when these holes line up, a hazard slips through the holes of 
the various layers of defenses leading to drift into failure (Dekker, 2011; Reason, 1997).  
However, safety assessment must consider the potential impact of any safety-
related event. Minor, or less serious events, may happen more frequently testifying the 
importance of including occurrence statistics rather than solely accident statistics (Di 
Gravio et al., 2015). Using proactive safety indicators, Monte Carlo simulation has the 
potential to provide an analytical model, based on historic data distributions, allowing the 
decision-maker to model potential events and determine how these less serious events, or 
occurrences, impact the safety of the system.  
Over the past decade, Monte Carlo simulation has been used for modeling and 
calculating aircraft collision risk both on the ground and in the air. Jacquemart and Morio 
(2013) created a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate conflict probabilities between 
aircraft, demonstrating the utility of Monte Carlo simulation for air transportation safety. 
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Belkhouche (2013) utilized Monte Carlo simulation for collision risk modeling and 
assessment for autonomous air vehicles to calculate the probability of a mid-air collision 
occurring in the presence of uncertainties. According to Belkhouche (2013), Monte Carlo 
methods have an important advantage in aircraft collision risk modeling because it does 
not explicitly use speed and orientation information, such as collision cone angles, to 
calculate the probability of a collision occurring in the presence of uncertainties in non-
linear systems with non-Gaussian, or non-normal, distributions; rather, collision risk is 
expressed as simple inequalities allowing for the estimation of probability under difficult 
and varying scenarios. In their text, Dunn and Shultis (2011) exemplify the application of 
Monte Carlo methods across domains and situations of varying complexity. Careddu, 
Costantino, and Di Gravio (2008) and Stroeve, Blom, and Bakker (2013) have used 
Monte Carlo methodologies to validate advancements made on runway incursion events. 
Di Gravio, Mancini, Patriarca, and Costantino (2015) conducted a study aimed at 
improving Air Traffic Management safety by creating a statistical model of safety events 
using Monte Carlo simulation to predict safety performance, further validating the utility 
of Monte Carlo simulation in improving air transportation safety. However, the extant 
literature indicates a deficit of Monte Carlo simulation models to be used as safety 
decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. 
Based upon a review of the relevant literature and due to the influx of 
uncertainties and daily variability in the air traffic system, Monte Carlo is an appropriate 
method for forecasting safety performance within the aviation industry. Further, for the 
purpose of the research, Monte Carlo is the most appropriate methodology due to a large 
majority of the input variables being subject to uncertainty. 
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Gaps in the Literature 
Although forecasting methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation, have grown in 
application in the aviation sector over the past decade, the industry still relies heavily on 
reactive processes, such as risk matrices alone and SPIs, within their SMS risk 
assessment process. SPIs, although useful in measuring the effectiveness of the SMS, are 
incapable of providing a true predictive approach to safety. A thorough review of the 
extant literature indicated a gap in the process of transitioning from traditionally reactive 
SPIs into safety decision-making tools with forecasting abilities for safety decision-
making purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations. Further research is 
needed to transform SPIs within a non-statistical model into predictive safety decision-
making tools capable of taking proactive safety one step further by modeling the potential 
of the system without compromising resources.  
The extant literature also indicates a deficit of validated models capable of 
utilization as decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. Two commercial airlines, legacy carrier, Southwest Airlines, and a large, 
low-cost carrier based out of Brazil, are currently in the process of developing safety 
performance tools based on risk assessment models composed of domain-specific SPIs; 
however, these models do not utilize simulation and are reactive in nature. The models 
developed by these air carriers apply to commercial operations and would be difficult to 
adapt to flight training operations. Thus, the research conducted for this dissertation fills 
an operational need within the industry.  
This research fills these gaps by providing a validated safety decision-making 
tool, specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, bolstering the research in the 
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area of proactive, rather than reactive, aviation risk assessment techniques. The model 
could also be adapted to accommodate the operational needs of any flight training 
organization with data procurement abilities and an operational SMS.  
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework driving the research was founded upon a non-statistical 
model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020). 
Anderson et al. (2020) conducted a sequential, mixed-method design study including a 
qualitative data collection and analysis phase, followed by a quantitative data collection 
and analysis phase. 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the area of CFR Part 141 maintenance and 
flight operations selected the appropriate Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). Once the 
appropriate SPIs had been selected, formulas were developed to quantify each selected 
SPI, based on monthly, operational-performance data collected by a CFR Part 141 flight 
school in the Southeast region of the United States. The Risk Indicator Score Card was 
developed to compute a standardized risk score for each month of both flight and 
maintenance operations. Expert elicitation was used to establish inter-rater reliability for 
the assessment of SMEs’ evaluations.  
Twelve SPIs were selected for use within the model. SPIs 1-6 MX encased the 
maintenance side of operations; SPIs 1-6 FLT includes indicators relevant to flight 
operations. The SPIs, variables, and brief descriptions can be found in Table 1. Table 2 





Figure 1. Diagram of the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) 




Safety Performance Indicators and Attributing Variables  
SPI Variables Description 
SPI-1 MX: Schedule 
Pressure 
 
Logistical Delay Time (minutes) 
 
Used to measure the 
schedule pressure faced by 
personnel; provides insight 




SPI-2 MX: Schedule 
Pressure/ Personnel 
Aviation technicians available 
Fleet flight time 
 
Used to determine whether 
there are too few 
technicians available 
increasing the likelihood of 
an error occurring. 
 
SPI-3 MX: Schedule 
Pressure/ Aircraft 
Percentage of aircraft available 
Total aircraft in fleet 
 
Analyzes the schedule 
pressure technicians 
experience by assessing the 
number of aircraft down for 
maintenance relative to the 
total number of aircraft 
available in the fleet. 
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SPI Variable Descriptions 
SPI-5 MX: 
Unscheduled Events 
Unscheduled maintenance orders 
under $10k 
FAA occurrences reports 
Fleet flight time 
 
Measures the oversights 
made by technicians; 
although rare, selected due 
to the catastrophic nature 
associated with errors 
committed by maintenance 
personnel. 
 
SPI-6 MX: Errors Number of aircraft dispatched 
with maintenance errors 
Number of total work orders 
processed 
 
Selected to capture the total 
volume of maintenance 
orders processed related to 
fleet flight time; indicates 
the overall health of the 
operation and insight into 
when a safe threshold of 
schedule pressure may have 
been exceeded. 
   
SPI-1 FLT: 
Occurrences  
Number of reported tail strikes 
Number of hard landings 
Number of unstabilized 
approaches 
Number of RPM overspeeds 
Number of over/under G 
exceedances 
Number of flap overspeeds 
Fleet flight time 
 
Selected as a general 
assessment of how safely 
the aircraft are being flown. 
SPI-2 FLT: Safety 
Culture 
Safety culture survey criterion 
Number of safety culture surveys 
received 
 
Based upon the institution’s 
yearly safety culture survey 
designed to annually assess 




SPI-3 FLT: NMACs Number of traffic conflicts 
Fleet flight time 
 
Chosen for tracking internal 
traffic conflicts. 
SPI-4 FLT: Staffing Number of full-time equivalent 
instructor pilots (average weekly) 
Active flight students (average 
weekly) 
 
Selected to assess the level 
of saturation within the 
flight department to ensure 
there are enough flight 
instructors staffed to meet 




SPI Variables Description 
SPI-5 FLT: 
Turnover 
Number of months flight 
instructors are active at the 
institution 
Selected to measure the 
average experience level of 
instructor pilots working at 
the institution; it was 
assumed a correlation exists 
between the level of 
experience and safety. 
   
SPI-6 FLT: Safety 
Reporting 
 
Number of events reported 
 
Selected as an assessment of 




Damage and Related 
Impact 
Number of NTSB accident 
reports 
Number of FAA incident reports 
Number of unscheduled 
maintenance reports > $10,000 
Fleet flight time 
Provides a comprehensive, 
external perception of the 
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𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟





(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠) +
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑃𝑀 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔)







(0.039 ∗ 𝑃𝐼3) + (0.064 ∗ 𝑆𝑂3) + (0.079 ∗ 𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆3) + (0.085 ∗ 𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆8) + (0.092 ∗ 𝑃𝑆1)
+(0.081 ∗ 𝑃𝑆3) + (0.067 ∗ 𝑃𝑆7) + (0.043 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑆1) + (0.07 ∗ 𝐸𝐶2) +
(0.072 ∗ 𝑅𝑆2) + (0.043 ∗ 𝑄𝑁𝐻4) +
(0.032 ∗ 𝑄𝑁𝐻5) + (0.018 ∗ 𝑀𝑂1)



























 𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) +  𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 +





The Risk Indicator Score Card. Ultimately, an individual standardized risk 
score, as well as an overall risk score, was developed to calculate the monthly level of 
risk associated with flight and maintenance operations. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
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nonstatistical model output before its transformation into the Risk Indicator Score Card. 
Depicted in Figure 3, the model output transitions into the Risk Indicator Score Card, 
representing risk on a 0-5 risk scale. Figure 4 demonstrates the display format potential of 
the Risk Indicator Score Card for utility and ease of use. 
 
 
Figure 2. Nonstatistical model output prior to Risk Indicator Score Card transition.  
Note. Notational data only. Not representative of actual data or performance. 
 
 
Figure 3. Output of the Risk Indicator Score Card.  






Figure 4. Display potential for the Risk Indicator Score Card.   
Note. Notational data only. Not representative of actual data or performance. 
 
 
Similar efforts. Southwest Airlines and a Brazilian low-cost carrier are 
conducting similar efforts relevant to commercial flight operations. Both airlines are in 
the process of developing or have developed an algorithm that provides a risk score for 
both the operation and individual safety scores for each department (Southwest Airlines, 
2019). Using the foundations of ICAO Annex 19 and FAA guidance, Mendonca and 
Carney (2017) have also developed a model for CFR Part 141 operators; however, the 
model focuses specifically on using the four components of SMS and is intended to 
encourage a thriving safety culture among CFR Part 141 operatives. Additionally, the 
model developed by Mendonca and Carney (2017) has no predictive capabilities.  
From reactive to predictive safety monitoring. The research conducted for this 
dissertation transformed the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) 
into a predictive, Monte Carlo simulation composed of real-time data input for the chosen 
SPIs. The Monte Carlo simulation is useful for safety decision-making to run what-if 
scenarios for the assessment of how variations to input variables impact the overall level 
of operational risk within the organization’s flight department.  
Summary 
Under Annex 19, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requires 
members to establish a State Safety Program, requiring certain services be provided to 
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implement a Safety Management System (SMS). SMS provides CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations with the ability to foresee and mitigate potential safety risks before 
an adverse event occurs (Chen & Chen, 2014). SMS encourages taking a proactive 
approach to safety by continuing to develop and adapt the safety risk management 
process.  
Traditionally, aviation safety has been managed on the basis of analyzing 
accidents and incidents after they have already occurred. Although this strategy has 
allowed the industry to make strides in improving safety, a major drawback is the 
reactive nature of this approach; safety analysis based on hindsight has restricted the 
process to primarily focus on innately undesirable aspects within the system (Patriarca, 
Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019). Effective safety monitoring should take a proactive 
approach by assessing the various components of the system and how they contribute to 
the functioning of the system as a whole. SMS has traditionally utilized SPIs to supervise 
known safety risks and expose developing risks to elicit corrective action before an 
adverse event occurring. SPIs play a valuable role in SMS by enabling performance-
based safety management. However, SPIs are reactive in nature; therefore, introducing 
novel techniques to safety assessment beyond reactive risk matrices, such as a predictive 
safety decision-making tool, will transform the risk assessment process from reactive to 
predictive with very little risk involved. This is a modern approach to safety management 
and includes safety risks being addressed proactively rather than relying on inspections 
and remedial actions. 
Researchers also argue that a proactive, systematic analysis of safety risk 
management utilizing modern techniques, such as forecasting, could aid in evolving an 
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industry that has traditionally been reactive to one that is proactive in its risk assessment 
process (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; Insua, Alfaro, Gomez, Hernandez-Coronado, & 
Bernal, 2019; Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). Forecasting models provide sophisticated 
methods to assess the outcomes of aviation safety occurrences to bolster an aviation 
organization’s safety risk management practices (Insua et al., 2019). Further, forecasting 
models could be utilized for decision-making purposes by aviation authorities, insurance 
companies, aviation operators, aviation companies, and aviation training facilities (Insua 
et al., 2019).  
Monte Carlo simulation provides a useful methodology to account for 
uncertainties in the model’s predictive algorithms and allows for the modeling of intricate 
systems where uncertainty exists, or random variables are involved, to assess the impact 
of risk without impacting the real system (Spall, 2003). Over the past decade, Monte 
Carlo simulation has been used for modeling and calculating aircraft collision risk both 
on the ground and in the air. However, the extant literature indicates a deficit of Monte 
Carlo simulation models to be used as safety decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations. Based on a review of the relevant literature and due to 
the influx of uncertainties and daily variability in the air traffic system, Monte Carlo is an 
appropriate method for forecasting risk within the aviation industry. 
A thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of 
transitioning from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety decision-making tools with 
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight 
training operations. The extant literature also indicates a deficit of validated models 
capable of utilization as decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training 
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organizations. This research fills these gaps by providing a validated safety decision-
making tool, specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, bolstering the research in 
the area of proactive aviation safety assessment techniques. The model could also be 
adapted to accommodate the operational needs of any flight training organization with 
data procurement abilities and an operational SMS.  
The theoretical framework driving the research is the non-statistical model 
developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020). 
Anderson et al. (2020) built and validated, via expert elicitation, a non-statistical model 
composed of 12 Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) encompassing both flight and 
maintenance operations. The data is based on a two-year sample of operational 
performance data from a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training facility in the southeastern 
United States. SPIs were used to develop a Risk Indicator Score Card depicting the level 






The dissertation utilized the Monte Carlo simulation method to build a safety 
decision-making tool based on SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) to represent 
flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to evaluate 
predictive, what-if scenarios to evaluate how the variations to controllable input variables 
affect the risk score outputs indicating the level of risk posed to safe operating conditions. 
The study did not involve human subject testing or data collection from human subjects; 
thus, the research did not require Institution Review Board (IRB) approval.  
Research Method Selection 
The study used the quantitative method to convert the non-statistical model 
developed by Anderson et al. (2020) using Monte Carlo simulation into a safety decision-
making tool to run what-if scenarios to assess how modifications to the controllable input 
variables impact the level of operational risk within an organization’s flight department. 
The use of Monte Carlo simulation is valuable in accommodating the uncertainty and 
variability of 22 uncontrollable input variables, as the only controllable input variables 
are the four listed below. The remaining variables were subject to uncertainty. 
• The number of full-time instructor pilots, 
• The number of aviation maintenance technicians available,  
• The number of active flight students, and  
• The total number of aircraft in the fleet.  
Papadopoulos and Yeung (2001) describe many advantages for using Monte 
Carlo simulation to address uncertainty, including the ability of Monte Carlo simulation 
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to handle large amounts of uncertainty within the input variables and the lack of concerns 
regarding the interactions between input variables. Faghih-Roohi et al. (2014) support the 
use of Monte Carlo simulation for risk modeling due to the probabilistic attributes 
associated with risk; whereas basic statistics, such as summary statistics or accident rates, 
are insufficient for long-term risk prediction. Monte Carlo methods also allow for 
sensitivity analyses and evaluation of the system without the need to operate the real 
system, leaving valuable resources uncompromised (Spall, 2003). Thus, the model 
created for the purpose of this dissertation can exemplify the effects of uncertainty in 
typical, collegiate flight operations by simulating many thousand potential outcomes to 
generate an accurate representation of the range of probable outcomes given the 
uncertainty of the uncontrollable input variables (Farrance & Frenkel, 2014).  
The current research addresses the following research questions: 
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, 
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety 
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios? 
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk 
performance score? 
To address Research Question 1, Monte Carlo simulation was utilized to 
transform the non-statistical risk assessment model composed of SPIs developed by 
Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. 
Research Question 2 was answered by utilizing distributions and ranges of values to 
simulate the many thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing 
for an assessment of how the variations to the controllable input variables influence the 
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overall level of operational risk. After manipulating the controllable input variables, or 
resources with respect to personnel, students, and aircraft, the probability distribution 
output from the what-if scenarios then allows safety personnel and administration to 
make more informed safety-related decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the 
what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary resources. 
Population and Sample  
Population and sampling frame. The target population to which the model 
generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations within the 
United States operating under the specifications defined by the FAA within Title 14 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The 
sampling frame consisted of two-years of operational data from both flight and 
maintenance operations dating from September 2017 to September 2019 for a large, 
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States. 
Sample size. The sample data used to determine the probability distributions of 
the uncontrollable input variables within the model was comprised of two years of 
operational flight and maintenance data from a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight 
training organization in the southeastern United States. Monte Carlo simulation utilizes 
probability distributions drawn from raw operational data to simulate the vast range of 
operating conditions within large, CFR Part 141 operations.  
Sampling strategy. To ensure simulation scenarios are representative of the 
target population, true operational ranges representative of a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations in the United States were used to enhance the 
generalizability of the model. The study conducted simulation runs based on the true 
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operational ranges specified below to simulate the range of operating conditions possible 
within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization with varying levels of 
resources with respect to personnel (Aviation Maintenance Technicians and Instructor 
Pilots), students, and aircraft: 
• Aviation Maintenance Technicians available: 14-35 
• Aircraft available: 50-82 
• Full-time Instructor Pilots: 100-200 
• Active Flight Students: 335-1300 
These ranges were selected because they are reflective of the higher and lower 
operational limits of the sample data drawn from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training operation in the southeastern United States. The model could easily be adapted 
for use in both small and large CFR Part 141 flight training organizations and any flight 
training organization with data procurement abilities and an operational SMS. 
Data Collection Process  
Design and procedures. This section describes the design and use of the 
mathematical model in detail. Figure 5 depicts the structural definition of the model in 
Analytica. The green-colored squares depict the four controllable input variables. The 
light blue-colored ovals represent the 22 uncontrollable input variables specified as 
probability distributions supplying an array of random values to the model based on 
probability distributions drawn from the raw data sample. The blue rounded rectangular 
boxes are SPIs from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) and 
depict calculation nodes producing the results of the model. The equations driving these 
calculations can be found in Table 5 and will be described further later in this section. 
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The orange trapezoid represents a value that is input as a constant. The impact value was 
input into the model as a constant value as injuries and damage are challenging to predict 
due to their variability in nature. Thus, a constant value of 1 indicated no damage or 
injuries incurred was selected for the purpose of this dissertation. The pink hexagons 
represent the risk score output variables. 
 




Monte Carlo process and steps. The steps involved in preparing, creating, and 
running a Monte Carlo simulation can be found in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. Monte Carlo steps and processes overview adapted from “Stats: data and 
models,” by R.D. De Veaux, P. F. Velleman, and D. E. Bock, 2012. Copyright 2012 by 
Pearson Education, Inc.  
 
Step 1-Defining the problem and simulation features. The first step involves 
identifying the problem, scope, and research questions for driving model development. A 
detailed discussion of the problem, scope, and research questions driving the research can 
be found in Chapter 1 of this manuscript.  
Step 2- Variable identification. The next step involves identifying the key 
components and variables within the model. The input variables for the model were 
selected based on the contributing variables relevant to each SPI within the non-statistical 
model developed by Anderson et al. (2020). The variables, relevant SPIs, and 
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categorization as either uncontrollable or controllable input variables can be found in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Input and Output Variables for the Model 
 
Relevant SPI Variables Variable Type 
 Fleet flight time (hobbs) 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
SPI-1 MX: Schedule 
Pressure 
Logistical Delay Time (minutes) 
Input 
Uncontrollable 






SPI-3 MX: Schedule 
Pressure/ Aircraft 
Percentage of aircraft available 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Total aircraft in fleet 
Input 
Controllable 
SPI-4 MX: Schedule 
Pressure/ Flow 










 FAA occurrences reports 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
SPI-6 MX: Errors 
Number of aircraft dispatched 





Number of reported tail strikes 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Number of hard landings 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Number of unstable approaches 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Number of RPM overspeeds 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Number of G exceedances 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
 Number of flap overspeeds 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
SPI-2 FLT: Safety 
Culture 









Relevant SPI Variables Variable Type 
SPI-3 FLT: NMACs Number of traffic conflicts 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
SPI-4 FLT: Staffing 
Number of full-time equivalent 









SPI-5 FLT: Turnover 
Number of months flight 




SPI-6 FLT: Safety 
Reporting 
Number of events reported 
(ASAP and event) 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
Damage and Related 
Impact 








Number of unscheduled 
maintenance reports > $10,000 
Input 
Uncontrollable 
Outputs Maintenance Score Output 
 
Damage and Related Impact 
Score 
Output 
 Flight Score Output 
 Overall Risk Score Output 
 
 
Step 3- Defining parameters. The third step involved defining the input 
parameters for each variable. This included defining the probability distribution of the 
data relevant to each variable and the associated equations for each SPI to the variable’s 
parameters. To accomplish this, a two-year sample of operational data from a large, 
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization was analyzed.  
Determining the distributions for uncontrollable inputs. The distributions for the 
uncontrollable inputs were derived from a two-year sample of operational data from a 
large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United 
States. Utilizing Minitab 19 statistical software, the sample of data for each 
uncontrollable input was run through Minitab 19 to identify the distributions of the data. 
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Each sample of data produced a Goodness of Fit Test table and probability plots to 
visually identify the distributions. The visual probability plots were used to initially 
determine distributions of the data, and the p-values from the Goodness of Fit Test table 
were used to validate the distributions. The distributions for the uncontrollable inputs can 
be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Probability Distributions for Uncontrollable Input Variables  
 
Uncontrollable Input Variable Data Type Probability Distribution 
Fleet flight time (hobbs) Continuous Normal 
Logistical Delay Time (minutes) Continuous Weibull 
Percentage of aircraft available Discrete Uniform 




Unscheduled maintenance orders 
under $10k 
Discrete Binomial 
FAA occurrences reports Discrete Geometric 
Number of aircraft dispatched 
with maintenance errors 
 
Discrete Bernoulli 
Number of reported tail strikes Discrete Poisson 
Number of hard landings Discrete Poisson 
Number of unstable approaches Discrete Lognormal 
Number of RPM overspeeds Discrete Poisson 
Number of G exceedances Discrete Poisson 
Number of flap overspeeds Discrete Poisson 
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Uncontrollable Input Variable Data Type Probability Distribution 
Number of traffic conflicts Discrete Binomial 
Number of months flight 
instructors are active at 
institution (average) 
Continuous Certain 
Number of events reported 










Number of FAA incident reports Discrete Binomial 
Number of unscheduled 
maintenance reports > $10,000 
Discrete Poisson 
 
Defining outcome equations. Once the distributions have been determined, the 
outcome for each component of the model was defined. This was accomplished by 
defining the associated equations for each SPI to the variable’s parameters in Analytica. 
Table 5 delineates each SPI, the Damage and Related Impact variable, and their 
associated equations that were used within the model. The mathematical algorithms and 
concepts used for the simulations were derived from focus group participants and SMEs 
in the areas of flight and maintenance operations at a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organization and were externally validated utilizing an independent group of 



























𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑙𝑒





















𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟







(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠)+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)+
(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠)+
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑃𝑀 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟⁄ 𝑔)









































 (𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) +  𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 +










(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 0)







(𝑆𝑃𝐼 1 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 2 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.15) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 3 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) +







(𝑆𝑃𝐼 1 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.25) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 2 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.125) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 3 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.25)






Risk Score  
 
∑ [
(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.3) + (𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.3)
+(𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.4)
] 
 
Step 4- Define simulation scenarios. Next, the simulation scenarios were defined. 
For the purpose of the research, the scenarios were based upon manipulation of the four 
controllable input variables: the number of aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) 
available, the total number of aircraft in the operational fleet, the number of active flight 
students, and the number of full-time equivalent instructor pilots (IPs).  
The selection of scenarios for the study was designed to reflect typical operating 
conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 training operation and included 
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manipulation of the controllable input variables to simulate changes to typical operating 
conditions to determine how these changes impacted the level of risk within the system as 
a whole. The study conducted simulations runs with the following specifications to 
provide output data for a large, CFR Part 141 operation with varying levels of resources. 
 
Table 6 
Ranges of Controllable Input Variables for Simulation Runs  
 
Controllable Input Range 
AMTs available 14-35 
Aircraft available 50-82 
Full-time instructor pilots (Ips) 100-200 
Active flight students 335-1300 
 
These ranges were selected because they are reflective of the higher and lower 
operational limits of the sample data drawn from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training operation in the southeastern United States. By conducting simulation runs that 
model a range of available resources with regard to personnel, students, and aircraft, 
decision-makers could then determine the optimal level of resources necessary to meet 
operational demands while staying above a predetermined level of acceptable risk, 
thereby maintaining safety. Data collected from the scenarios, defined by using different 
specifications for the controllable input variables, were compared for sensitivity effects 
and were organized in a graphical output depicting the relationship between the 
controllable inputs and resulting risk score outputs. 
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Step 5- Select control values. To demonstrate the utility of the safety performance 
decision-making tool for real-world use, the controllable input values used to generate the 
what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model were determined based on 
permutational variations drawn from the ranges of normal operating conditions specific 
to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, depicted in Table 6. The selection of 
specific scenarios for the study focused on manipulating the controllable input variables: 
the number of aviation maintenance technicians available, the total number of aircraft in 
the fleet, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active flight 
students. The output of the model included probability curves depicting how changes to 
the controllable input variables impacted the flight score, maintenance score, damage and 
related impact score, and overall risk score output. The controllable input values for the 
four What-if Scenarios can be found in Table 17 of Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
Step 6- Run the simulation. Once the conceptual model was created in Analytica 
and the variable parameters and distributions were defined, the software ran the 
simulation model with 10,000 trials. The model utilizes Analytica® by Lumina Decision 
Systems as the software to complete the simulation. The Analytica software defines the 
mathematical model using a flowchart-type graphical representation and defines 
distributions for use as input data while providing the processing environment for 
repeated trails. The software also collects and organizes output data from each simulation 
trial to statistically analyze, examine, and compare scenario results. The simulation model 
predicts safety by rendering outputs based on four primary, controllable input variables: 
aviation maintenance technicians available, total aircraft in fleet, number of active flight 
students, and the number of full-time equivalent instructor pilots. These controllable 
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input variables were manipulated to assess how changes to the controllable inputs 
impacted the outputs, or risk scores. 
Step 7- Analyze the results. The results of the scenario were then analyzed to 
determine how the defined changes to the input variables impacted the outputs: the flight 
score, the maintenance score, damage and related impact score, and the overall risk score. 
Analysis of the results, including model validation, was conducted by performing a 
descriptive statistical analysis of the output tables for all trials within a particular 
scenario. The output tables contained the calculated probability of data from the various 
scenarios. The output tables were then organized in graphical format depicting the 
relationships between the controllable variables and the subsequent changes to the flight 
score, maintenance score, and overall risk score outputs. A sensitivity analysis was 
utilized to test edge cases, based on data from the various scenarios, to determine if the 
model could be modified to increase the overall sensitivity of the risk score outputs. 
Step 8- Next scenario/stop. From this point, the criteria for the next simulated 
scenario could be defined and run until a sufficient number of scenarios have been 
completed. The next step required a decision to be made between returning to Step 4- 
Define the simulation scenarios, or returning to Step 1 and repeating the steps required to 
run another scenario. For the purpose of this dissertation, upon completion of the fourth 
What-if Scenario, the decision was made to stop adding scenarios.  
Apparatus and materials. The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation 
was Analytica Educational Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems. 
This software allows researchers to model the uncertainty and variability of the input 
variables within the model. With Analytica, the researcher can graphically design the 
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model simulation, as depicted by the screenshot of the simulation model from Analytica 
in Figure 5. Microsoft Excel 2013 was used to process the data and to analyze and 
illustrate characteristics of the intermediate input data, or SPIs, generated by the 
algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel 2013 was also used for post-hoc 
testing and analysis. 
Sources of the data.  The sample of data used to determine the probability 
distributions for the uncontrollable input variables was drawn from a two-year sample of 
operational flight and maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019 
from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern 
United States. The time period of September 2017 to September 2019 was selected to 
accurately capture probability distributions that are representative of the most current 
operating conditions, following the academic calendar, for a large, collegiate CFR Part 
141 flight training organization. Utilizing probability distributions that are representative 
of the most current operating conditions enhances the validity of the model. The sample 
of data was analyzed in MiniTab Statistical Software to obtain Goodness of Fit tests to 
determine the probability distributions of the data sample to use within the Monte Carlo 
simulation. The study did not involve any human subjects or experimentation.  
Ethical Considerations  
Using simulations to support executive decision-making introduces various types 
of ethical concerns related to the reliability and validity of the model. According to 
Barlow (2009), models are often deliberately built and used to form the basis for various 
forms of analysis using simulation techniques, the results of which are used to support 
organizational decision-making; the consequences associated with supporting executive 
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decision-making via modeling techniques is the potential impact on innocent third 
parties. The “utility of a (simulation) study depends on the quality of the model and the 
skill of the modeler” (Barlow, 2009, p. 433). This testifies to the fundamental limitation 
of the modeling and simulation process − the development of a model and simulation 
provides no guarantee of a valid or successful outcome. Therefore, there is an ethical 
obligation to ensure the reliability and validity of both the SPIs driving the model, as well 
as the safety decision-making tool itself, before application and implementation within a 
CFR Part 141 flight training organization.  
Data Analysis Approach  
Reliability assessment method.  Various trials of the model were ran using 
different random number generator seed values to confirm the output of the simulation 
produced consistent results across trials. The distributions of the output variables were 
compared with descriptive statistics from simulation to simulation to demonstrate 
consistency. ANOVA testing was used to test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt, 
1941). 
To assess the model’s reliability, the outputs were compared. Arbitrarily selected 
random number generator seed values were chosen to guarantee a different sequence of 
random numbers is produced for each trial. The seed value establishes the starting 
position in Analytica’s random number generation function. This tests the model to 
determine if the results produced were consistent. ANOVA testing was conducted to 
determine if significant differences existed between the outputs of the reliability tests.  
Validity assessment method.  Typically, model validation occurs by utilizing 
two separate activity threads where one thread is used to ensure the mathematical 
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calculations produced the expected results, and the other thread is used to compare the 
probability outputs of the model to similar models. In this case, the challenge with 
establishing a formal comparison of results between this model and the models developed 
in other studies is that no other studies directly address the same research questions. 
Rather, little work has been done in the realm of predictive modeling for large, collegiate 
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. Researchers from the Brazilian low-cost 
carrier and Southwest Airlines are currently developing a similar model for assessing risk 
in CFR Part 121 operations, but their models are reactive in nature rather than predictive. 
Both the Brazilian low-cost carrier and Southwest Airlines have yet to publish their 
findings. Therefore, model validation occurred via the use of Subject Matter Experts 
using a standardized expert elicitation questionnaire distributed in a survey format 
(Anderson et al., 2020). Expert elicitation is the process of acquiring probabilistic belief 
statements from experts in a particular domain to assist in the process of quantifying 
uncertainty (Colson & Cooke, 2018). Inter-rater reliability was determined by calculating 
Kappa values. Since more than two experts were utilized, the use of Fleiss’ Kappa was 
most appropriate (Stemler & Tsai, 2008).  
The mathematical formulae used within the SPIs were derived from the formulae 
developed by Anderson et al. (2020). The formulae developed by Anderson et al. (2020) 
were established and validated via the expert elicitation process based on feedback from 
SMEs. To ensure no error occurred during the process of inputting the mathematical 
computations into the model, Verification Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 were conducted to ensure 
the random number generators produced a set of data values that is representative of the 
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raw data sample. Each node within the model was assessed and manually verified to 
ensure the expected results.  
Data analysis process.   Both Microsoft Excel and Minitab 19 Statistical 
software were used for basic statistical analysis. The model produced a set of probability 
curves demonstrating the operating conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 
flight training organization given different values of the controllable inputs. The study 
ran the simulation with 10,000 trials for a given scenario with manipulated controllable 
input values. Analytica rendered the results of each scenario in graphical and statistical 
formats capturing the output from each scenario in separate result matrices. The mean, 
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values were used to determine the impact 
on either the flight or maintenance score and the overall risk score. ANOVA testing was 
also used to test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). A Generalized 
Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) (Spear & Hornberger, 1980) was conducted to analyze the 
results of the What-if Scenarios. GSA is a technique that considers the sensitivity of 
model outputs to model inputs by separating the input parameter values into two 
distributions: those that created results that exceeded a specific threshold (“failed”) and 
those that created results that were below the threshold (“pass”). Separating the model 
output into two sample sets allows for the evaluation of the two sample sets as a function 
of any predetermined input parameter selected to represent a threshold of safe operation. 
GSA can also detect the presence of high output values for specific ranges of input 
parameters better than the other methods (Makino, McKenna, & Wakasugi, 2001). 
Conducting a GSA on the results of the what-if scenarios will allow for an enhanced, in-
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depth assessment of the resulting uncertainty within the model with respect to the effects 
of input parameter uncertainty. 
Summary  
The research builds a safety decision-making tool to evaluate what-if scenarios to 
evaluate how the changes to controllable inputs affect the SPIs determined by Anderson 
et al. (2020) to represent flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. This research combined with former researcher efforts (Anderson et al., 
2020) has provided the basis and expanded architecture used to build this model. 
Utilizing a quantitative methodology, the goal of the study was to expand the non-
statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) using Monte Carlo simulation to 
develop a safety decision-making tool to run what-if scenarios to assess how variations to 
the controllable input variables impacted the level of operational risk within an 
organization’s flight department. Monte Carlo analysis was applied to enable the model 
to defensibly handle uncertainty in several key input variables while enabling the model 
to describe the range of possible outcomes given a set of controllable inputs to the model.  
The target population to which the model generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations within the United States operating under the 
specifications defined by the FAA under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 
141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The sampling frame consisted of the 
operational data from both flight and maintenance operations for a large, collegiate CFR 
Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States. The sample data 
used to determine the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables 
within the model was based on a two-year sample of operational data from SPIs 
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developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organization in the southeastern United States.  
The study conducted simulation runs based on specified ranges to simulate the 
range of operating conditions possible within large, CFR Part 141 operations with 
varying levels of resources concerning personnel (AMTs and IPs), students, and aircraft. 
These ranges were chosen because they are representative of flight training operations 
within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training operations (Anderson et al., 2020). 
The selection of scenarios for the study was based on permutational variations of typical 
operating conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 training operation and 
included manipulation of the controllable input variables to simulate various operating 
conditions. The controllable input variables were manipulated to effectively simulate the 
operating conditions of a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization. 
These ranges were chosen because they were found to be representative of real-world 
flight training operations within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. 
The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation was Analytica Educational 
Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems. Microsoft Excel 2013 was 
used to process the data and analyze and illustrate characteristics of the intermediate 
input data, or SPIs, generated by the algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel 
2013 was used for post-hoc testing and analysis. 
Various trials of the model were ran using different random number generator 
seed values to confirm the output of the simulation produced consistent results across 
trials. The distributions of the output variables were compared with descriptive statistics 
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from simulation to simulation to demonstrate consistency. ANOVA testing was used to 
test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). To assess the model’s reliability, 
the outputs were compared. Arbitrarily selected random number generator seed values 
were chosen to guarantee a different sequence of random numbers is produced for each 
trial.  
Concerning model validation, the challenge with establishing a formal 
comparison of results between this model and the models developed in other studies is 
that no other studies directly address the same research questions. Rather, little work has 
been done in the realm of predictive modeling for large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the non-
statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving 
the computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, 
Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to 
develop the safety performance decision-making tool.  
The model produced a set of probability curves demonstrating the operating 
conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization given 
different values of the controllable inputs. The study ran the simulation with 10,000 trials 
for a given scenario with manipulated controllable input values to identify the sensitivity 
of the results to specific probabilistic inputs within the model. Analytica rendered the 
results of each scenario in multiple graphical forms capturing the output from each 
scenario in separate result matrices. The mean, standard deviation, maximum, and 
minimum values were used to determine the impact on either the flight or maintenance 
score and the overall risk score. ANOVA testing was also used to test for differences 
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across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). A Generalized Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) was 
conducted to evaluate the results of the what-if scenarios and determine if the sensitivity 






Chapter 3 described the steps necessary to transform a nonstatistical model 
composed of domain-specific SPIs into a safety performance decision-making tool, using 
Monte Carlo simulation, to run what-if scenarios to assess how variations to the 
controllable input variables impact the level of operational risk within a large, collegiate 
CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Determining the probability distributions of the 
uncontrollable input variables from the sample data allowed for the nonstatistical model 
to be transformed into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.  
This chapter describes the results in four general sections. The first three sections 
answer the first research question – how can the SPI model developed by Anderson, 
Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, 
safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios? 
Section one details the output of the verification testing process. Section two includes 
data describing the reliability test results of the model. Section three depicts the validity 
test results of the model. The fourth section demonstrates the utility of the model both 
statistically and graphically in response to research question two – how do changes to the 
controllable input variables impact the Overall Risk Score?  
Demographic Information  
The sample data used to determine the probability distributions of the 
uncontrollable input variables for the Monte Carlo simulation was comprised of two 
years of operational flight and maintenance data from September 2017 to September 
2019 from a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the 
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southeastern United States. The sample is 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. 
Descriptive statistics of the raw data sample can be found in Table 7. The demographic 
distribution of the sample 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization can be found in 
Figure 6. Operating at a capacity of approximately 7,000 flight hours per month, the 
demographic results of the sample fall within the normal range of operating conditions 
determined to be representative of 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations by 
SMEs in the area of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.  
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw Data Sample  
 
SPI Variable Lower Limit Higher Limit Mean SD 
1-MX Logistical delay time 100 310 203.8579 46.7893 
2-MX AMTs Available* 14 35 21 3.5033 
 Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
3-MX Percent of AC 
available 
70 100 83.8003 4.6361 
 Total AC available* 50 82 62.236 6.2056 
4-MX Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
 Total MX orders 
processed 
100 1200 514.9677 118.706 
5-MX Unscheduled MX 
orders <$10K 
300 1000 468.1397 132.7093 
 FAA occurrences 0 40 6.32 4.7847 
 Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
6-MX Total MX orders 
processed 
100 1200 514.9677 118.706 
 AC dispatched w/ MX 
error 
0 2 0.12 0.3317 
      
1-FLT Unstable approaches 0 946 78.0129 229.9836 
 Flap overspeeds 0 3 0.56 0.7118 
 G exceedances 0 3 0.44 1.0033 
 Tail strikes 0 10 1.64 1.9339 
 RPM overspeeds 0 3 0 0 
 Hard landings 0 7 1.2 1.6583 
 Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
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SPI Variable Lower Limit Higher Limit Mean SD 
2-FLT Annual SC survey 
results 
1 5.76 4.6 0.0181 
3-FLT Traffic conflicts 0 18 8.04 3.0752 
 Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
4-FLT Full-time Ips* 100 200 138 8.8600 
 Active flight students* 335 1300 656 179.8793 
5-FLT Months as an IP 0 12 10 0 
6-FLT Event reports 25 150 67.3372 20.5756 





FAA incident reports 
0 3 0.2 0.4082 
 Unsched MX > $10K 0 3 0.96 1.5133 
 NTSB reports 
0 3 0.16 
0.3742 
 
 Fleet flight time 4000 13500 7365.717 1674.774 
*Controllable input variable 
 
Model Verification Testing  
The simulation used Analytica 64-bit Educational Professional software Release 
4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decision Systems. To ensure the model’s algorithms were accurately 
entered in the simulation software, the content of each node of the model depicted in 
Figure 5 was verified for consistency with the model equations depicted in Table 5.  
Input nodes, comprised of probability distribution data, were statistically and 
graphically examined to substantiate the output conformed to each input’s specific 
distribution profile, as determined by a two-year sample of raw operational flight and 
maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019 from a large, 
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States. 
Computational nodes, depicted by light blue rounded rectangles in Figure 5, were verified 
by comparing the node’s simulated output to the results of manual calculations drawn 
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from the sample data. There are 22 uncontrollable inputs that were supplied as random 
numbers within the bounds of their specified probability distributions. These inputs can 
be found in Table 3. For model verification purposes, the output of each of these 
distributions is examined below from a simulation run with 10,000 trials.  
Three Verification Scenarios were conducted. Within Verification Scenario 1, the 
values selected to serve as controllable input variable values in Table 8 were determined 
by calculating the mean value for each variable of the sample data. The purpose of using 
the mean value of each variable from the sample data was to ensure the output of the 
model was representative of the CFR Part 141 flight training organization’s true 
operating conditions determined by the raw data sample.  
The values for the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were 
drawn from the low values of the operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations depicted in Table 6, whereas the controllable input variables for 
Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values. High and low 
range values were selected to represent the varying operational capacities of the target 
population. By conducting simulation trials that model a range of available resources 
concerning personnel, students, and aircraft, decision-makers could then determine the 
optimal level of resources necessary to meet operational demands while staying above a 








Verification Scenario 1 Controllable Input Values  
 
Controllable Input Value 
AMTs available 22 
Aircraft available 56 
Full-time instructor pilots (Ips) 138 
Active flight students 681 
Note. Source: Raw data means. Sample: 10,000; Random seed: 99 
 
Table 9 depicts the output values and the shape of the distribution for each 
uncontrollable input variable in Verification Scenario 1 extracted from the outputs of the 
model. The shape of the distributions of the uncontrollable input variables from 
Verification Scenario 1 is the same as the distributions drawn from the raw data sample. 
The higher and lower limits of the raw data sample were included for comparison 
purposes (Anderson et al., 2020).  
For each SPI, the higher limit was calculated by analyzing the two-year sample of 
data for a specific SPI, finding the operational month with the highest data point value 
and dividing the highest value by the operational month with the lowest data point value. 
A lower limit was determined by reversing the equation, and dividing the lowest value 
over a two-year span of sample data by the highest value. As determined by the model 
output for Verification Scenario 1, the mean values for all 22 uncontrollable inputs fell 





Verification Scenario 1 Comparison Input  
 












1-MX Logistical delay 
time 
102 297 212 Weibull 100 310 
2-MX AMTs Available* 22 22   14 35 
 Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
3-MX Percent of AC 
available 
70 100 85 Logistic 70 100 
 Total AC 
available* 
56 56   50 82 
4-MX Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
 Total MX orders 
processed 
100 800 532 Logistic 100 1200 
5-MX Unscheduled MX 
orders <$10K 
415 500 577 Binomial 300 1000 
 FAA occurrences 1 49 6 Geometric 0 40 
 Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
6-MX Total MX orders 
processed 
107 1036 535 Logistic 100 1200 
 AC dispatched w/ 
MX error 
0 1 0.05 Bernoulli 0 2 
        
1-FLT Unstable 
approaches 
6 767 156 Lognormal 0 946 
 Flap overspeeds 0 3 0.55 Poisson 0 3 
 G exceedances 0 3 0.42 Poisson 0 3 
 Tail strikes 0 7 2.72 Poisson 0 10 
 RPM overspeeds 0 1 0.5 Poisson 0 3 
 Hard landings 0 5 1.7 Poisson 0 7 
 Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
2-FLT Annual SC survey 
results 
4.6 4.6 4.6 Certain 1 5.76 
3-FLT Traffic conflicts 1 25 10 Binomial 0 18 
 Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
4-FLT Full-time Ips* 138 138   100 200 
 Active flight 
students* 
681 681  
 
335 1300 
5-FLT Months as an IP 10 10 10 Certain 0 12 
6-FLT Event reports 
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0 1 0.2 Binomial 0 3 
 Unsched MX > 
$10K 
0 3 0.91 Poisson 0 3 
 NTSB reports 0 1 0.34 Binomial 0 3 
 Fleet flight time 4006 13300 7602 Normal 4000 13500 
*Controllable input variable 
 
Once the uncontrollable input variables were verified to be representative of the 
raw data based on the shape of the probability distribution outputs, the minimum, 
maximum, and mean values for each calculation node, or SPI, were compared with the 
lower and higher limits of the raw data, shown in Table 10. Close inspection indicated the 
model’s output, including the maximum and minimum values, were generally lower than 
the lower and higher limits of the raw data; however, the mean values of the SPIs all fall 




Verification Scenario 1: SPI Comparison Outputs  
 
 SPI Distributions Raw Data Sample 
SPI Min Max Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
SPI-1 MX 1.712 4.874 3.532 1.6667 5.1667 
SPI-2 MX 0.0016 0.0055 0.003 0 0.00875 
SPI-3 MX 1.25 1.786 1.516 0.8537 2 
SPI-4 MX 0.0121 0.1888 0.0731 0.0074 0.3 
SPI-5 MX 0.0369 0.1393 0.0698 0 0.26 
SPI-6 MX 0 0.005 0.0001 0 0.02 
      
SPI-1 FLT 0.001 0.1799 0.0224 0 0.0302 
SPI-2 FLT 4.6 4.6 4.6 1 5.76 
SPI-3 FLT 0.0002 0.0034 0.0013 0 0.0045 
SPI-4 FLT 4.9348 4.9348 4.9348 2 8 
SPI-5 FLT 10 10 10 0 36 
SPI-6 FLT 35 103 67 0 200 
 
 The next step in the verification process included examining each standardized 
SPI as well as the Damage and Related Impact variable, depicted in Figure 5 as a blue 
rounded rectangular computational node. To accurately feed into a standardized risk 
score output ranging from 0-5, the model fed each SPI computational node into an 
individual standardized SPI node. The output for each standardized SPI computational 
node, as well as the standardized Damage and Related Impact variable, were compared 
with the lower and higher limits of the raw data. This output can be found in Table 11. 
Results indicated that the mean values of each standardized SPI and the standardized 
Damage and Related Impact variable fell between the lower and higher limits of the raw 





Verification Scenario 1: Standardized SPI Comparison Outputs  
 
 SPI Distributions Raw Data Sample 
SPI Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
SPI-1 MX 0 5 2.878 0.8883 4.8501 2.5948 
SPI-2 MX 2.112 4.609 3.717 2.1639 4.2139 3.285 
SPI-3 MX 1.73 4.064 2.882 1.1229 3.4422 2.8129 
SPI-4 MX 0 5 1.724 0.2209 1.3921 1.103 
SPI-5 MX 0 5 1.601 0.3281 1.7218 1.2976 
SPI-6 MX 0 5 0.0974 0 0.4562 0.0512 
       
SPI-1 FLT 0 5 0.5917 0.0189 2.0034 0.5187 
SPI-2 FLT 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.2185 1.2185 1.2185 
SPI-3 FLT 0 5 1.702 0.3660 2.0590 1.1916 
SPI-4 FLT 2.446 2.446 2.446 0.4610 3.9552 2.4291 
SPI-5 FLT 3.611 3.611 3.611 3.6111 3.6111 3.6111 
SPI-6 FLT 0 5 2.382 0.8000 4.0250 3.108 








Verification Scenario 1: Risk Score Output Comparisons  
 
 Output Variable Distributions Manual Calculation 
Risk Score Output Min Max Mean Min Max 
Maintenance 
Score 
1.007 2.805 1.49 0.9272 1.7378 




0 0.4197 0.084 0 0.3349 
Overall Risk Score 0.7336 1.609 1.015 0.7854 1.1698 
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges 
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced 




 Finally, Table 12 depicted the mean, minimum, and maximum values for the Risk 
Score probability density outputs for maintenance, flight, the Damage and Related 
Impact, and the Overall Risk Score for the operation as a whole. The risk score outputs 
were manually calculated using the raw data sample values for two years of operational 
flight and maintenance data from a CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the 
southeastern United States. For verification purposes, the maximum and minimum values 
were used. The mean output for all four of the controllable risk score outputs fell between 
the maximum and minimum values of the raw data sample. Thus, the output values 
calculated by Analytica, specifically the mean values, fell within the bounds of the 
manual calculations of the outputs, given the input values used for verification testing. 
The resulting outputs produced the following distribution of values shown below in 
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
 
 




Figure 6 demonstrates the resulting probability density distribution output of the 
Maintenance Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean risk score output 
of 1.49, indicating a safe level of maintenance operation under the specifications for the 
controllable input variables. The shape of the distribution visually indicates the vast range 
of potential output scores resulting from running the simulation through 10,000 trials.  
 
 
Figure 7. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 7 demonstrates the probability density distribution output of the Flight 
Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean risk score output of 1.781 
indicating a safe level of flight operation under the specifications for the controllable 
input variables with the outputs centered close to the mean; however, when compared to 







Figure 8. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in 
Verification Scenario 1. 
 
 
Figure 8 reveals the probability density distribution output of the Damage and 
Related Impact Score in Verification Scenario 1. The mean risk score output for the 
Damage & Related Impact Score was 0.084 indicating a safe operation. The erratic shape 
of the distribution is due to the infrequency of NTSB reports, FAA incident reports, 
unscheduled maintenance events greater than $10,000, and a static Impact Value of 1 
indicating no accidents or incidents. However, these values were assigned high weights 
due to their importance within the system. The combination of infrequent occurrence and 









Figure 9. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification 
Scenario 1.  
 
 
Figure 9 shows the probability density distribution output of the Overall Risk 
Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean overall risk score output of 
1.015, indicating a safe level of the overall operation under the specifications for the 
controllable input variables.  
To ensure no programming error occurred, two additional Verification Scenarios 
were performed using different controllable input variables. Verification Scenario 2 was 
conducted using the range lows as values for the controllable input variables. Verification 
Scenario 3 utilized the range highs as values for the controllable input variables. The 






Verification Scenarios 2 and 3 Controllable Input Values  
 
Controllable Input Verification Scenario 2 
Value 
Verification Scenario 3 
Value 
AMTs available 14 35 
Aircraft available 50 82 
Active flight students 335 1300 
Full-time instructor pilots (Ips) 100 200 
Note. Source: Operational range highs and lows; Sample: 10,000; Random seed: 99 
 
The results, depicted as risk score outputs for the Maintenance Score, Flight 
Score, Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, is depicted in 
Tables 14 and 15. Overall, the model produced the results expected based on the 
controllable input variable specifications. The individual outputs for each uncontrollable 
input variable, SPI comparison outputs, and standardized SPI outputs from Verification 





Verification Scenario 2: Risk Score Output Comparisons  
 
 Model Manual Calculation 
Risk Score Output Min Max Mean Min Max 
Maintenance 
Score 
1.168 3.006 1.667 0.9272 1.7378 




0 0.4197 0.084 0 0.3349 
Overall Risk Score 0.7321 1.628 1.021 0.7854 1.1698 
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges 
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced 
viable output values. 
 
Table 15 
Verification Scenario 3: Risk Score Output Comparisons  
 
 Model Manual Calculation 
Risk Score Output Min Max Mean Min Max 
Maintenance 
Score 
0.66 2.387 1.106 0.9272 1.7378 




0 0.4197 0.084 0 0.3349 
Overall Risk Score 0.6828 1.517 0.9486 0.7854 1.1698 
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges 
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced 
viable output values. 
 
 
Reliability Testing  
Monte Carlo simulation modeling uses randomly selected numbers from 
predetermined probability distributions to produce data outputs in the form of probability 
distributions to account for the uncertainty inherent to the 22 uncontrollable input 
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variables. Testing was conducted across multiple trials using various random number 
generator seed values to ensure the results remained consistent across trials. The mean 
probability output represents the forecasted level of operational risk on a standardized 0-5 
risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage and Related Impact, and an 
Overall Risk Score representative of the operation as a whole over 10,000 trials of the 
simulation model.  
The model was tested using various numbers of trial iterations ranging from 10 
trials up to 30,000 trials. Although the results varied, the results were nearly identical 
after 10,000 trials for a given test. Ultimately, this study used 10,000 trials. To evaluate 
the reliability of the model, the study compared the results of three different iterative runs 
of the model—each using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random 
numbers for the uncontrollable input variables. The controllable input values for the three 
different runs of the model are the same as those used in Verification Scenario 1 (see 
Table 8). Analyzing the output with different seed values allows for the model to be 
verified for consistency in its results. 
In each scenario, 10,000 trials were executed, and three arbitrarily selected 
random number generator seed values were selected to ensure the model produced a 
different set of random numbers across trials. The seed value determines the starting 
position in the random number generation; thus, different seed values cause the software 
to produce different samples of random numbers within the simulation. Using different 
samples of random numbers tests the model to see if it produces consistent results 
regardless of the starting point, or seed value.  
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To reflect the operating conditions of a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organization, the values chosen for the four controllable input variables were 
based on the mean values drawn from two years of operational flight and maintenance 
data. Again, the values for the four controllable input variables are as follows:  
• Aviation maintenance technicians available: 22 
• Total aircraft in fleet: 56 
• Full-time instructor pilots: 138 
• Active flight students: 681 
Table 16 depicts the results of the reliability testing using different seed values. 
For each group of results, three different seed values generated three different samples of 
random numbers. Thus, the model ran 10,000 trials, producing 10,000 results for each of 
the three different samples of random numbers. Table 16 also shows the mean and 
standard deviation of the outputs for each of these runs. No significant differences 
appeared among the different sets of results indicating the results are statistically reliable. 
This study used ANOVA to test for differences across the three groups (Hoyt, 1941). The 



















99 1.49 0.1686 3.6446 0.3071 
 50 1.491 0.1606   
 10 1.492 0.1638   
      
Flight Score 99 1.781 0.2627 81 0.0704 
 50 1.784 0.2628   
 10 1.792 0.2692   




99 0.0835 0.0687 0.25 0.7048 
 50 0.0829 0.0692   
 10 0.0833 0.0680   
      
Overall Risk 
Score 
99 1.015 0.0978 36 0.1051 
 50 1.016 0.0958   
 10 1.018 0.0986   
Note. No significant differences appear among the different sets of results;  
thus, the results are considered statistically reliable. 
 
Assumptions for ANOVA were also tested. The large sample size of the 
simulated data meets the normality assumption. Levene’s testing verified the satisfaction 
of the homogeneity assumption. A non-significant Levene’s statistic test (p > 0.05) 
indicates the homogeneity of variance among the test groups. As shown in Table 16, the 
p-values for all cases are greater than 0.05, indicating there are no significant differences 




Validity Testing  
The challenge with establishing a formal comparison of results between this 
model and the models developed in other studies is that no other studies directly address 
the same research questions. Additionally, little work has been done in the realm of 
predictive modeling specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the non-
statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving 
the computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, 
Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to 
develop the safety performance decision-making tool.  
The peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) validated the 
non-statistical model and associated equations via the use of Subject Matter Experts using 
a standardized expert elicitation survey questionnaire. Expert elicitation was used to 
establish inter-rater reliability for the assessment of SME evaluations. The Fleiss’ kappa 
value was 0.0360, indicating a fair level of agreement among raters. Qualitative feedback 
was solicited and SMEs were asked to provide any comments or feedback on the model 
and equations driving the model to justify their rating scores. SMEs were in a high level 
of agreement relative to the overall utility of the model in providing a quantitative 
indicator of flight risk for large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. 
Thus, the equations driving the predictive, safety performance decision-making tool 
developed in this dissertation have been previously validated through the peer-reviewed 
research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020). 
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Additionally, three Verification Scenarios of the model were conducted using the 
validated equations determined by Anderson et al. (2020). Within Verification Scenario 
1, the values selected to serve as controllable input variable values were determined by 
calculating the mean value for each variable of the sample data. The purpose of using the 
mean value of each variable from the sample data was to ensure the output of the model 
was representative of the CFR Part 141 flight training organization’s true operating 
conditions determined by the raw data sample. Whereas the values for the controllable 
input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were drawn from the low values of the 
operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, the controllable input 
variables for Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values. 
High and low range values were selected to represent the varying operational capacities 
of the target population. Demonstrating the capability of the model using a wide range of 
available resources further enhances the validity of the findings. 
Monte Carlo Simulation Results  
To demonstrate the utility of the safety performance decision-making tool for 
real-world use, the controllable input values used to generate the what-if scenarios within 
the Monte Carlo simulation model were determined based on permutational variations of 
ranges of normal operating conditions specific to CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. These ranges can be found in Table 6. These permutations were conducted 
by varying the level of personnel, including available aviation maintenance technicians 
and instructor pilots, as low, moderate, or high. Similarly, permutations of resource 
expenditures, including aircraft available and active flight students, were also varied by 
degree of low, moderate, or high. Low values consisted of the lowest possible range 
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values, moderate values consisted of the median value, and high range values consisted 
of the highest value of the predetermined, true, operational ranges for a large, collegiate 
CFR Part 141 flight training organization. 
The Analytica software tool computed each trial using the specified controllable 
input variables listed in Table 17, capturing the output from each trial in a separate results 
matrix for each trial. This allowed the model to compute the risk score outputs, depicted 
as probability results, for the controllable input values given for each simulation trial. 
 
Table 17 




e Input  
Value Description  
Scenario 1 AMTs 14 Low personnel, high expenditures 
 Aircraft 82  
 IPs 100  
 Students 1300  
    
Scenario 2 AMTs 22 Moderate personnel, high expenditures 
 Aircraft 82  
 IPs 138  
 Students 1300  
    
Scenario 3 AMTs 35 High personnel, low expenditures 
 Aircraft 50  
 IPs 200  
 Students 335  
    
Scenario 4 AMTs 35 High personnel, moderate expenditures 
 Aircraft 56  
 IPs 200  
 Students 681  
Note.  AMTs = Aviation maintenance technicians; Aircraft = Aircraft available; IPs= 





Results of What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4   
What-if 
Scenario 
 Output  Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
Scenario 1 Maintenance Score 1.39 0.1683 
 Flight Score 2.621 0.2566 
 
Damage & Related 
Impact Score 
0.0835 0.0687 
 Overall Risk Score 1.237 0.0967 
    
Scenario 2 Maintenance Score 1.283 0.1578 
 Flight Score 2.248 0.2566 
 
Damage & Related 
Impact Score 
0.0835 0.0687 
 Overall Risk Score 1.092 0.0951 
    
Scenario 3 Maintenance Score 1.396 0.1601 
 Flight Score 1.441 0.2566 
 
Damage & Related 
Impact Score 
0.0835 0.0687 
 Overall Risk Score 0.8845 0.0955 
    
Scenario 4 Maintenance Score 1.317 0.1563 
 Flight Score 1.621 0.2566 
 
Damage & Related 
Impact Score 
0.0835 0.0687 
 Overall Risk Score 0.9149 0.0949 
 
What-if Scenario 1 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario where 
personnel, including AMTs and instructor pilots, are low, but the necessary expenditures, 
including aircraft and active flight students, are high. The probability density distribution 
output for What-if Scenario 1 can be found in Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13. Based on the 
specific controllable input variables used, results indicated What-if Scenario 1 had the 
highest mean value for the Overall Risk Score and the Flight Score, indicating a higher 
level of operational risk associated with conditions where a flight instructor capacity of 
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100 full-time instructors is not adequate to meet the demands of 1300 flight students, 
increasing the level of operational risk, specifically in the flight department. Although 















Figure 12. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in 
What-if Scenario 1.  Output scores between -1 and 0 are representative of occurrences in 




Figure 13. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario 
1.  
 
What-if Scenario 2 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario similar 
to What-if Scenario 1; however, in What-if Scenario 2, the number of personnel, 
including AMTs and instructor pilots, was increased from 14 AMTs to 22 and 100 
instructor pilots to 138. The expenditures, consisting of aircraft and active flight students, 
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remained high. The probability density distribution output for What-if Scenario 2 can be 
found in Figures 14, 15, 16, and 17. Intuitively, both the Flight and Maintenance Scores 
improved from What-if Scenarios 1 to 2 indicating a reduction in the level of operational 
risk by closing the gap between the number of instructor pilots and active flight students, 
thus lowing the Overall Risk Score. The lowest Maintenance Score occurred in What-if 












Figure 15. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in What-if Scenario 2.  
 
 
Figure 16. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in 





Figure 17. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario 
2.  
 
What-if Scenario 3 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario 
opposite of What-if Scenarios 1 and 2 where there is an excess of personnel and a low 
level of expenditures, including a low number of flight students and few aircraft 
available. The probability density distribution output for What-if Scenario 3 can be found 
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in Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21. The excess of personnel drove the Maintenance Score up 
from the previous trials indicating an excess of available maintenance technicians 
increased the level of risk within the maintenance department, negatively impacting 
safety. The Flight Score was the lowest in What-if Scenario 3 indicating a 1:1 ratio of 
instructor pilots to flight students is optimal. Of all four What-if Scenarios, What-if 
Scenario 3 had the lowest Overall Risk Score (M = 0.8845, SD = 0.0955) indicating the 


















Figure 20. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in 





Figure 21. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario 
3.  
 
Finally, What-if Scenario 4 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario 
similar to What-if Scenario 3; however, in regard to the expenditures, aircraft was 
increased from 50 to 56, and the number of flight students was increased from 335 to 
681. The amount of available personnel remained high. The probability density 
distribution output for What-if Scenario 4 can be found in Figures 22, 23, 24, and 25. 
Within What-if Scenario 4, the Flight Score increases from 1.441 to 1.621 indicating the 


















Figure 24. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in 





Figure 25. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario 
4.  
 
 Table 19 depicts a comparison of the mean scores and standard deviations for 
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 to compare the mean risk score outputs demonstrating 
how changes to the inputs lead to differences in the risk score outputs. Figures 26, 27, 
and 28 depict visual comparisons of the risk score outputs for What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 categorized by maintenance, flight, and overall risk score outputs. The x-axis 
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displays the risk score outputs for the model across scenarios, and the y-axis represents 
the probability of occurrence in percentages. 
 
Table 19 










Output Score M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Maintenance 1.39 (0.17) 1.283(0.16) 1.396(0.16) 1.317 (0.16) 




0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 
Overall Risk  1.237 (0.10) 1.092 (0.10) 0.8845 (0.10) 0.9149 (0.09) 
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Results indicate the lowest risk score for maintenance occurred in What-if 
Scenario 2, where the level of personnel was moderate, yet expenditures, including 
aircraft and students, were high.  
 
 
Figure 27. Flight Score What-if Scenario Comparison Chart  
 
 
The lowest risk score for flight occurred in What-if Scenario 3, where the level of 
personnel was high, and expenditures were low. The Damage and Related Impact Score 
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Figure 28. Overall Risk Score What-if Scenario Comparison Chart  
 
 
What-if Scenario 3 also had the lowest Flight Score and Overall Risk Score, 
indicating operations are at the lowest level of risk when the level of personnel is high, 
yet the amount of expenditures remains low. Although intuitive, this demonstrates the 
real-world utility of the model.  
A Generalized Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) was conducted using a one-factor-at-a-
time approach. The purpose of conducting a GSA was to locate sensitive parameters, or 
those that have the greatest effect on the model, and non-sensitive parameters, or those 
input variables causing stagnation of the model. Findings of the GSA indicated a lack of 
sensitivity within the Damage and Related Impact Score. This may be partially due to the 
Impact Factor feeding into the model as a constant variable with a definition of 1, chosen 










0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5
Risk Score Output
Overall Risk Score What-if Comparisons
Overall Scenario 1 Overall Scenario 2 Overall Scenario 3 Overall Scenario 4
93 
 
obscurity of accidents in CFR Part 141 flight training operations; injuries, fatalities, and 
the extent of damage are situationally specific and thus challenging variables to predict. 
Due to this, a constant of 1 was used, indicating no injuries and no damage to people or 
property occurred to demonstrate model utility. However, the sensitivity of Overall Risk 
Score output did not change by removing the Impact Value constant variable.  
To improve the overall sensitivity of the model, What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 
were rerun as Sensitivity Trial Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the Damage and Related 
Impact Score pathway removed. However, removing the Damage and Related Impact 
Score and associated input variables also required an adaption to the Overall Risk Score 
equation and model weights. The adapted equation for the Overall Risk Score is 
portrayed below. The model weights for Maintenance and Flight were changed from 0.3 
to 0.5 to accommodate the removal of the Damage and Related Impact score, which had a 
weight of 0.4.  
 
(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.5) + (𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.5) 
 
 Figure 29 depicts the conceptual layout of the model in Analytica with the 
Damage and Related Impact Score pathway and associated input variables removed to 
determine if the sensitivity of the model improves. Results of Sensitivity Trial Scenarios 










Results of Sensitivity Trial Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4   
 Maintenance Score Flight Score Overall Risk Score 
Scenario M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
What-if Scenario 1 1.39 (0.17) 2.621 (0.26) 1.237 (0.10) 
Sensitivity Trial 
Sceanrio 1 
1.39 (0.17) 2.621 (0.26) 
2.005 (0.15) 
    
What-if Scenario 2 1.283(0.16) 2.248 (0.26) 1.092 (0.10) 
Sensitivity Trial 
Scenario 2 
1.283(0.16) 2.248 (0.26) 
1.765 (0.15) 
    
What-if Scenario 3 1.396(0.16) 1.441 (0.26) 0.8845 (0.10) 
Sensitivity Trial 
Scenario 3 
1.396(0.16) 1.441 (0.26) 
1.419 (0.15) 
    
What-if Scenario 4 1.317 (0.16) 1.621 (0.26) 0.9149 (0.09) 
Sensitivity Trial 
Scenario 4 





 Overall, results of the Sensitivity Trial Scenarios indicated that removing the 
Damage and Related Impact Score pathway did little to improve the sensitivity of the 
model. As demonstrated in Table 20, removing the Damage and Related Impact Score 
pathway only impacts the Overall Risk Score. However, with this pathway removed, the 
Overall Risk Score outputs are slightly higher, capturing an increased level of risk than 
they had been within the What-if Scenarios.  
Removing the Damage and Related Impact Score pathway restricts the utility of 
the model by failing to account for the key variables included by Anderson et al. (2020) 
in the non-statistical model due to its value in depicting the overall level risk associated 
with the operation at a particular given time. The Damage and Related-Impact variable, 
although reactive in nature and challenging to accurately forecast, provides an external 
perception of the risk associated with the whole operation and should remain a valuable 
portion of the safety decision-making tool.  
Summary 
Using Monte Carlo simulation, a safety decision-making tool was developed to 
assess how changes to the controllable input variables impact the level of operational risk 
within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Before model 
execution, input nodes supplying distribution data were examined to ensure the output 
produced by the model aligns with the predetermined probability distributions of the 
uncontrolled input variables, as determined by a two-year sample of raw operational 
flight and maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019 from a 
large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United 
States. The output of each computational node of the model was verified by comparing 
96 
 
the node’s output to the results of manual calculations drawn from the two-year sample of 
operational data. There were 22 uncontrollable inputs to the model. 
For model verification purposes, the output of each of these distributions was 
examined from a simulation run with 10,000 trials. Three Verification Scenarios were 
conducted. The values for the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were 
drawn from the low values of the operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations, and the controllable input variables for Verification Scenario 3 were drawn 
from high operational range values. High and low range values were selected to represent 
the varying operational capacities of the target population. To ensure no programming 
error occurred during the construction of the model, two additional Verification Scenarios 
were performed using different controllable input variables.  
Reliability Testing was performed using different random number generator seed 
values to verify the model produced consistent results. The study compared the output 
from three different runs of the model—each using a unique seed value to ensure a 
different sample of random numbers for the uncontrollable input variables, which 
remained the same across trials. Based on the results of ANOVA output, no significant 
differences appeared among the different sets of results, indicating the results are 
statistically reliable.  
This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the non-statistical model 
developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the 
computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage 
and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to develop the 
safety performance decision-making tool. The peer-reviewed research conducted by 
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Anderson et al. (2020) validated the non-statistical model and associated equations via 
the use of Subject Matter Experts using a standardized expert elicitation survey 
questionnaire. Thus, the equations driving the predictive, safety performance decision-
making tool developed in this dissertation have been previously validated through the 
peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020).  
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to demonstrate the utility of the 
safety performance decision-making tool for real-world use. The controllable input 
values used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model 
were determined based on permutational variations of the ranges of normal operating 
conditions for the target population − large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. Each what-if scenario ran the model through 10,000 trials to generate the 
output datasets. Comparison of the four trials effectively demonstrated the utility and 
potential for the safety performance decision-making tool.  
Results of the GSA indicated that removing the Damage and Related Impact 
Score pathway does improve the sensitivity of the model; however, the improvement is 
very minor. Removing the Damage and Related Impact Score pathway restricts the utility 
of the model by failing to account for the key variables included by Anderson et al. 
(2020) in the non-statistical model due to its value in depicting the overall level of risk 





DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter discusses the results described in Chapter IV and addresses the 
research questions from Chapter I. This chapter examines the data produced by the 
simulation model developed for this study, discusses the analysis of the data, and 
identifies the study’s conclusions. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of the 
study and provides recommendations for future research.  
The purpose of the research was to create and validate a safety performance 
decision-making tool to transform a non-statistical model composed of 12 SPIs 
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to be 
most indicative of flight risk specific to 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations into 
a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.  The model uses what-if scenarios 
to evaluate how changing controllable input variables affect the level of operational risk 
within the system, portrayed within the model as the risk score outputs. 
The study derived the outputs, or risk scores, from a Monte Carlo simulation 
model. A Monte Carlo simulation accounts for the uncertainties present within the real-
world operating conditions of a complex, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organization. The model created for this study produced probability distribution output 
data to provide critical, safety decision-making information on the level of operational 
risk associated with manipulating the following controllable input variables: number of 
aviation maintenance technicians available, number of aircraft available, number of full-
time instructor pilots, and the number of active flight students. The data driving the 
distributions for the uncontrollable input variables found in Table 3 were drawn from a 
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two-year sample of operational flight and maintenance data from a large, collegiate CFR 
Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.  
Discussion 
To effectively create and validate a safety decision-making tool, it was first 
necessary to define both the scenarios and the input values to be used by the model. Since 
this study focused on creating a model specific to large, collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations, the selected permutational scenarios intended to represent 
the vast range of operating conditions for collegiate, 14 CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. The probability distributions used for the uncontrollable input variables 
were also drawn from the same two-year sample of operational flight and maintenance 
data from a large, collegiate flight training organization in the southeastern United States. 
Thus, the risk score outputs of the model are specific to the operating conditions of the 
particular CFR Part 141 flight training organization used within the sample. However, the 
equations driving the predictive model have been validated in the peer-reviewed literature 
by Anderson et al. (2020) indicating the model could easily be adapted for immediate use 
by any collegiate, Title 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization with data collection 
capabilities and an active SMS by determining the appropriate uncontrollable input 
distributions specific to that organization’s operating conditions.  
The following section will address the research questions driving the study, 
explain how findings are supported, and describe how the findings fit into the existing 
body of knowledge surrounding predictive modeling for large, collegiate CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations. 
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Research Question 1: How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, 
Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, 
safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios? 
To address Research Question 1, this dissertation outlines the process of 
transforming a non-statistical risk assessment model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) 
composed of 12 domain-specific SPIs and associated equations into a predictive, safety 
performance decision-making tool using a two-year sample of operational flight and 
maintenance data from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the 
southeastern United States to determine uncontrollable input probability distributions and 
demonstrate the utility of the model for real-world use. The safety performance decision-
making tool created for this dissertation utilizes what-if scenarios to simulate how 
changes to the four controllable input variables influence the risk scores, or outputs.  
Documented within the first three sections in Chapter IV, verification, reliability, 
and validity testing was either discussed or conducted on the safety performance 
decision-making tool to ensure findings were supported. Using Analytica 64-bit 
Educational Professional software Release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decision Systems, three 
Verification Scenarios were run on the predictive model. Within Verification Scenario 1, 
the values selected to serve as controllable input values were determined by calculating 
the mean value for each variable based on the two-year sample of raw data. The purpose 
of using mean values for comparison purposes was to ensure the output of the model was 
representative of the raw sample data from the CFR Part 141 flight training organization. 
The values of the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were drawn from 
the low values of the operational ranges. Finally, values for the controllable input 
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variables in Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values for 
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. High and low range values were selected to 
represent the varying operational capacities of the target population. Results indicated 
that the simulation model’s mean output value fell between the higher and lower limits of 
the raw data sample. Overall, the model produced the results expected based on the 
controllable input variable specifications, effectively verifying the efficacy of the 
transition from a non-statistical risk assessment model in a predictive, safety performance 
decision-making tool. 
To further support the findings, reliability testing was conducted on the output of 
the simulation model. The outputs from three different runs of the model were 
compared—each using 10,000 trials and a unique seed value to ensure a different sample 
of random numbers for the uncontrollable input variables. Analyzing the output with 
different seed values allows for the model to be verified for consistency in its results 
despite the changes produced by the random number generator. Mean probability was the 
key output for this model. The mean probability output represents the forecasted level of 
operational risk on a standardized 0-5 risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, 
Damage and Related Impact Score, and Overall Risk Score. The results of the reliability 
trials were analyzed using ANOVA to test for differences across the three groups (Hoyt, 
1941). No significant differences appeared among the different sets of results indicating 
the results are statistically reliable. 
The challenge with results comparison between this model and the models 
developed in other studies is that no other studies directly address the same research 
questions. Additionally, little work has been done in the realm of predictive modeling 
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specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, leaving a deficit of 
validated models for comparison. However, this research utilized the peer-reviewed and 
validated equations drawn from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. 
(2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, including the SPIs, 
the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall 
Risk Score, as the foundation to develop the safety performance decision-making tool.  
Research Question 2: How do changes to the controllable input variables impact 
the overall risk score? 
To address Research Question 2 and demonstrate the utility of the model for real-
world use, distributions and ranges of values were utilized to simulate the many 
thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing for an assessment 
of how the changes to the controllable input variables impact the risk scores. The 
controllable input values used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo 
simulation model were determined based on permutational variations of the range of 
normal operating conditions specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. These 
permutations were conducted by varying the level of personnel, concerning available 
aviation maintenance technicians and instructor pilots, as low, moderate, or high. 
Similarly, permutations of resource expenditures, including aircraft available and active 
flight students, were also varied by degree of low, moderate, or high. Low values 
consisted of the lowest range values, moderate values consisted of the median value, and 
high range values consisted of the highest potential value of the predetermined, true, 
operational ranges for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization.  
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To support the findings and demonstrate the utility of the safety performance 
decision-making tool, four What-if Scenarios were conducted by manipulating the 
controllable input variables, or resources including personnel, students, and aircraft. 
What-if Scenario 1 was run with the intent of simulating a scenario where personnel, with 
regard to AMTs and instructor pilots, are low, but the necessary expenditures, consisting 
of aircraft and active flight students, was high. Within What-if Scenario 2, the number of 
personnel, including AMTs and instructor pilots, was increased from 14 AMTs to 22 and 
100 instructor pilots to 138. The expenditures, consisting of aircraft and active flight 
students, remained high. What-if Scenario 3 was conducted with the intent of simulating 
a scenario opposite of What-if Scenarios 1 and 2 where there is an excess of personnel 
and a low level of expenditures, including a low number of flight students and available 
aircraft. Within What-if Scenario 4, the number of expenditures in terms of aircraft was 
increased from 50 to 56, and the number of flight students was increased from 335 to 
681. The amount of available personnel remained high.  
 
Table 21 










Output Score M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Maintenance 1.39 (0.17) 1.283(0.16) 1.396(0.16) 1.317 (0.16) 




0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 0.084 (0.07) 





 Table 21 depicts a comparison of What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, demonstrating 
how changes to the inputs lead to differences in the risk score outputs. Results of the four 
What-if Scenarios indicate the lowest risk score for maintenance occurred in What-if 
Scenario 2, where the level of personnel was moderate, yet expenditures, concerning 
aircraft and students, were high. The lowest risk score for flight occurred in What-if 
Scenario 3, where the level of personnel was high, and expenditures were low. The 
Damage and Related Impact Score remained consistent throughout. What-if Scenario 3 
also had the lowest Flight Score and Overall Risk Score, indicating operations are at the 
lowest level of risk and optimum level of safety among trials under the following 
specifications:  
• Aviation Maintenance Technicians available: 35 
• Aircraft available: 50 
• Instructor Pilots: 200 
• Active Flight Students: 335 
As demonstrated by the mean probability output data produced by the simulation 
model, changes to the controllable input variables are reflected by variations to the risk 
score outputs demonstrating the utility and potential for the safety performance decision-
making tool. The risk score outputs produced from the what-if scenarios could then be 
utilized by safety personnel and administration to make more informed safety-related 
decisions, based on the mean level of operational risk predicted without expending 
unnecessary resources. The lowest Overall Risk Score occurs in What-if Scenario 3, 
indicating CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should strive to maintain an 
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appropriate balance of high personnel to low expenditures to maintain the optimum level 
of operational safety. 
This research fits into the existing body of knowledge surrounding the area of 
predictive aviation safety assessment techniques by providing detailed insight into the 
process of transitioning from traditionally reactive SPIs into a safety performance 
decision-making tool with forecasting abilities specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations. The extant literature indicated a deficit of these predictive, 
domain-specific safety performance decision-making tools. Thus, this reusable model 
pioneers the way for the inclusion of validated safety performance decision-making tools 
into the risk management component of flight training organizations’ SMS.  
Conclusions 
This dissertation demonstrated the process of transitioning from a non-statistical 
model composed of domain-specific, yet reactive, SPIs into a safety performance 
decision-making tool with forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes, 
specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations improving the risk management 
component of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations’ Safety Management System 
(SMS). Figure 5 illustrates the conceptual layout and structural definitions of the model 
in Analytica from Lumina Decision Systems. ANOVA testing found no significant 
differences between sets of results, indicating the model is statistically reliable. As the 
mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, or SPIs, are drawn from peer-
reviewed and previously validated research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020), the 
model is considered valid. Finally, What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to 
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effectively demonstrate the utility of the safety performance decision-making tool in 
influencing the risk score outputs. 
Theoretical contributions. This dissertation describes the process of 
transforming a nonstatistical model composed of domain-specific SPIs into a safety 
performance decision-making tool. It also extends the previously validated non-statistical 
model composed of SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) to be most indicative of 
flight risk specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to create 
a new, predictive, safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if 
scenarios. Determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables 
from the sample data allowed for the nonstatistical model to be transformed into a 
predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.  
The study demonstrates the utility of Monte Carlo simulation as a viable approach 
for handling input parameters with varying levels of uncertainty to assist in 
administrative, safety decision-making. Describing the potential outcomes as a range of 
outcomes provides insight into how potential changes to controllable inputs affect the 
level of risk within the system while acknowledging the results of actually making real-
world changes to the system may vary due to the uncertainties involved.  
The model will also provide a mechanism for expanding the breadth of 
knowledge related to optimizing resources from both flight and maintenance operations 
to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. Further, a 
thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of transitioning 
from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety performance decision-making tools with 
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to large, collegiate CFR 
107 
 
Part 141 flight training operations. With the literature indicating a deficit of a validated 
safety decision-making tool specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, this 
research has filled this gap by providing a validated, safety decision-making tool, specific 
to CFR Part 141 operations, to advance the applications of proactive, rather than reactive, 
aviation safety assessment techniques by modeling the potential of the system without 
compromising resources.  
Practical contributions. From a practical standpoint, this research will aid in 
shaping the current understanding of the factors most substantially contributing to flight 
risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, thereby 
improving overall flight safety. As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be 
used by the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organization to rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safety-related 
initiatives by modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs, 
without the risk associated with actually expending the organization’s resources. 
With a consistent stream of data updated on a monthly basis, CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations could utilize this safety decision-making tool to understand the 
impact altering the ratios of resources-to-expenditures has on the level of operational risk 
present within the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall. 
Results of the What-if Scenarios and Sensitivity Trial Scenarios indicated the trial with 
the lowest risk scores was What-if Scenario 3 and Sensitivity Trial 3. In both trials, the 
controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and 200 full-time instructor pilots 
to 335 flight students. Demonstrably, CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could 
lower their levels of risk, thereby improving their overall safety, by maintaining 
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conditions where there is enough personnel staffed to accommodate the level of 
expenditures, including aircraft and active flight students.  
For this dissertation, the data supplying the probability distributions for the 
uncontrollable input variables are drawn from a two-year sample of operational data 
ranging from 2017-2019 for a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training 
organization. However, the model could be adapted for use in any CFR Part 141 flight 
training organization with data acquisition capacities and an operational SMS simply by 
modifying the input value probability distributions to reflect the operating conditions of 
the selected 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Providing collegiate CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk 
management component of the operation’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive 
approach to safety by providing insight into the impact changes to operating conditions 
may have on the safety of the overall operation determined by evaluating the quantitative 
risk score outputs. The ability to forecast operating conditions using Monte Carlo 
simulation will allow CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to make better informed 
safety-related decisions while optimizing efficiency without compromising safety.  
Limitations of the Findings 
The research was limited to the creation and validation of a safety performance 
decision-making tool utilizing Monte Carlo simulation to transform a non-statistical 
model composed of the ten SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, 
safety decision-making tool capable of running what-if scenarios to determine how 
changes to input variables affect the levels of operational risk within the organization. 
The variables used in this model are limited to those found to be most relevant to 
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measuring flight risk in a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization by 
SMEs in the areas of both flight and maintenance (Anderson et al., 2020). The four 
controllable input variables selected for use in the simulation are just four pieces of a 
large and complex system. As demonstrated within What-if Scenarios 1-4, manipulating 
these controllable inputs does not drastically impact the risk score outputs, as the ranges 
of normal operating conditions used to determine the values for the controllable input 
variables may have not been broad enough to capture more dynamic variations to the risk 
score outputs.   
Recommendations 
The results of this study demonstrated the creation and validation of a safety 
performance decision-making tool. The safety performance decision-making tool should 
be utilized by safety personnel and administrators to make more informed safety-related 
decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the manipulation of controllable input 
variables within the what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary organizational 
resources. 
Recommendations for large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations. Large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should 
improve and streamline their operational data collection capabilities and storage to ensure 
the model is provided with accurate data to determine the uncontrollable input probability 
distributions. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should utilize a 
larger sample of raw operational flight and maintenance data to ensure the accuracy of 
the probability distributions for the uncontrollable inputs and the predictive utility of the 
model. Finally, large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should 
110 
 
explore the potential of utilizing different controllable input variables for use within the 
model. 
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could utilize this safety decision-
making tool to run what-if scenarios to understand the impact of altering the quantity of 
resources and expenditures, with regard to the number of AMTs available, the number of 
aircraft available, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active 
flight students and the influence these changes make on the level of operational risk for 
the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall. CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations could also use the model to determine an acceptable level of 
risk particular to their operation based on the manipulation of resources. Results of the 
model, based on the probability distributions drawn from a two-year sample of 
operational data, indicated the trial with the lowest risk scores occurred when there is 
enough personnel staffed to accommodate a low level of expenditures. In both trials, the 
controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and 200 instructor pilots to 335 
flight students simulating a scenario where the level of personnel is high but expenditures 
are low. To reduce the level of overall risk within the organization, CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations should evaluate their current ratios of AMTs to aircraft and 
instructor pilots to flight students to maintain an optimized level of balance and direct 
financial resources to accommodate an operation where the level of personnel is high yet 
expenditures are low.  
Recommendations for future research. Future research should focus on 
opportunities to further explore both the capabilities of the model and options for 
improving the accuracy of the model’s predictions. The ranges of normal operating 
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conditions used to determine the values for the controllable input variables may have not 
been broad enough to capture the potential for more dynamic variations to the risk score 
outputs. Future research could focus on expanding the range of operational values when 
determining controllable input variables to assess how changes to the risk score outputs 
are impacted with a more expansive range of operating conditions.  
In an attempt to increase the predictive potential of the model, future research 
should reevaluate the Damage and Related Impact variable, as it is composed of variables 
that are reactive in nature, making this SPI challenging to predict. Increasing the 
predictive accuracy of the Damage and Related Impact variable may increase the 
sensitivity of the Overall Risk Score output. Future research should also explore the 
potential of including additional controllable input variables, thereby leaving less up to 
chance. Future research should aim to improve the overall utility of the model for 14 CFR 
Part 141 flight training organizations by incorporating clear, measurable human 
performance variables into the model, assuming the data is available. To enhance the 
robustness of the model, future research should consider incorporating the three 
indicators (NAC, Weather, and ATC Delay), included in the original model by Anderson 
et al. (2020), due to their potential correlations with the SPIs and their unpredictable 
influence on day-to-day flight operations. 
Additionally, future research should explore the potential of incorporating 
machine learning techniques to allow for the data supplying the probability distributions 
for the uncontrolled input variables to be updated on a regular basis eliminating the need 
to manually update the distributions. This will improve the accuracy and predictive 
capabilities of the model. As monte carlo simulation can be used to quantify risk, future 
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research should also consider the alternative approach of utilizing optimization 
techniques to further minimize risk. 
Summary 
The purpose of the dissertation was to create and validate a safety performance 
decision-making tool to transform a reactive safety model into a predictive, safety 
performance decision-making tool, specific to large, collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141 
flight training organizations, to increase safety and aid in operational decision-making. 
The validated safety decision-making tool uses what-if scenarios to assess how changes 
to the controllable input variables impact the overall level of operational risk within an 
organization’s flight department.  
SPIs from the non-statistical SPI model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were 
used to create the safety performance decision-making tool, as these SPIs are most 
indicative of operational flight risk for a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization. 
However, a 14 CFR flight training organization could utilize its own unique SPIs by 
determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables, further 
enhancing the generalizability of the safety performance decision-making tool. Anderson 
et al. (2020) created and validated, via expert elicitation a non-statistical model composed 
of SPIs from both flight and maintenance operations and their relevant formulae based on 
two years of operational flight and maintenance data. The SPIs from the non-statistical 
model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were used as the foundation to develop a 
safety performance decision-making tool based on the input variables for the chosen 
SPIs. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and run to enable the SPI model to handle 
uncertainty in some of the key, influential variables. 
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As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be used by the 
administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization to 
rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safety-related initiatives by modeling 
the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs, without the risk associated 
with actually expending the organization’s resources. The model could also be adapted 
for use in any flight training organization with data acquisition capabilities and an active 
SMS.  
The research methodology has been designed to address the following research 
questions: 
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, 
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety 
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios? 
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk 
performance score? 
To address Research Question 1, Monte Carlo simulation was utilized to 
transform the non-statistical risk assessment model composed of SPIs developed by 
Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. In 
response to Research Question 2, distributions and ranges of values were utilized to 
simulate the many thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing 
for an assessment of how the changes to the controllable input variables impact the 
overall level of operational risk. After manipulating the controllable input variables, or 
resources with regard to personnel, students, and aircraft, the probability distribution 
output from the what-if scenarios then allows safety personnel and administration to 
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make more informed safety-related decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the 
what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary resources. 
The target population to which the model generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part 
141 flight training organizations within the United States operating under the 
specifications defined by the FAA within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The sampling frame consisted of two-
years of operational data from both flight and maintenance operations dating from 
September 2017 to September 2019 for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
organization in the southeastern United States. The sample data used to determine the 
probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables within the model was 
comprised of two years of operational flight and maintenance data from a large, 
collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.  
To ensure simulation scenarios are representative of the target population, true 
operational ranges representative of large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training 
organizations in the United States were used to enhance the generalizability of the model. 
The study conducted simulation runs based on the true operational ranges to simulate the 
range of operating conditions possible within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight 
training organizations with varying levels of resources regarding personnel (Aviation 
Maintenance Technicians and Instructor Pilots), students, and aircraft. 
The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation was Analytica Educational 
Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems. Microsoft Excel 2013 was 
used to process the data and to analyze and illustrate characteristics of the intermediate 
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input data, or SPIs, generated by the algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel 
2013 was also used for post-hoc testing and analysis. 
There are 22 uncontrolled inputs to the model specified as probability 
distributions. Three Verification Scenarios were conducted. Reliability Testing was 
performed with various numbers of trial runs and random number generator seed values 
to ensure consistent results despite the changing random number generator. To test the 
model reliability, the study compared the output from three different runs of the model—
each using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random numbers for the 
uncontrollable input variables, which remained the same across trials. Based on the 
results of ANOVA output, no significant differences appeared among the different sets of 
results, indicating the results are statistically reliable.  
The peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) validated the 
non-statistical model and associated equations via the use of Subject Matter Experts using 
a standardized expert elicitation survey questionnaire. Thus, the equations driving the 
predictive, safety performance decision-making tool developed in this dissertation have 
been previously validated through the peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et 
al. (2020).  
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to demonstrate the utility of the 
safety performance decision-making tool for real-world use; the controllable input values 
used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model were 
determined based on permutational variations of the ranges of normal operating 
conditions for the target population − large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training 
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organizations. Comparison of the four trials effectively demonstrated the utility and 
potential for the safety performance decision-making tool.  
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could utilize this safety decision-
making tool to run what-if scenarios to understand the impact of altering the quantity of 
resources and expenditures, in terms of the number of AMTs available, the number of 
aircraft available, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active 
flight students and the influence these changes make on the level of operational risk for 
the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall. As the focus of 
this dissertation was on the process of transforming a reactive model into a safety 
performance decision-making tool, a 14 CFR flight training organization could utilize its 
own unique SPIs by determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input 
variables, further enhancing the generalizability of the safety performance decision-
making tool. 
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could also use the model to determine 
an acceptable level of risk particular to their operation based on the manipulation of 
resources. Results of the model, based on the probability distributions drawn from a two-
year sample of operational data, indicated the trial with the lowest risk scores occurred 
when there is enough personnel staffed to accommodate a moderate amount of 
expenditures. In both trials, the controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and 
200 instructor pilots to 335 flight students simulating a scenario where the level of 
personnel is high but expenditures are low. To reduce the level of overall risk within the 
organization, CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should evaluate their current 
ratios of AMTs to aircraft and instructor pilots to flight students to maintain an optimized 
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level of balance and direct financial resources to accommodate an operation where the 
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Verification Scenario 2 Comparison Output 
  Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Variable Min Value Max Value Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
1-MX Logistical 
delay time 
100 290 212 100 310 
2-MX AMTs 
Available* 
14 14  14 35 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
3-MX Percent of AC 
available 
70 100 85 70 100 
 Total AC in 
fleet* 
50 50  50 82 
4-MX Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
 Total MX 
orders 
processed 




425 582 500 300 1000 
 FAA 
occurrences 
1 49 6 0 40 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
6-MX Total MX 
orders 
processed 
100 799 532 100 1200 
 AC dispatched 
w/ MX error 
0 1 0.05 0 2 
       
1-FLT Unstable 
approaches 
6 767 156 0 946 
 Flap 
overspeeds 
0 3 0.54 0 3 
 G exceedances 0 3 0.42 0 3 
 Tail strikes 0 7 3 0 10 
 RPM 
overspeeds 
0 1 0.5 0 3 
 Hard landings 1 5 1.7 0 7 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
128 
 
2-FLT Annual SC 
survey results 
4.6 4.6 4.6 1 5.76 
3-FLT Traffic 
conflicts 
2 14 9 0 18 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
4-FLT Full time Ips* 100 100  100 200 
 Active flight 
students* 
335 335  335 1300 
5-FLT Months as an 
IP 
10 10 10 0 12 
6-FLT Event reports 39 108 67 25 150 







0 1 0.12 0 3 
 Unsched MX > 
$10K 
0 3 0.9 0 3 
 NTSB reports 0 1 0.335 0 3 
 Fleet flight 
time 
















Verification Scenario 2: SPI Comparison Output 
 Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Min Max Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
SPI-1 MX 1.7125 4.828 3.5321 1.6667 5.1667 
SPI-2 MX 0.0010 0.0035 0.0019 0 0.00875 
SPI-3 MX 1.4 2 1.698 0.8537 2 
SPI-4 MX 0.0121 0.1888 0.073 0.0074 0.3 
SPI-5 MX 0.0369 0.1393 0.0697 0 0.26 
SPI-6 MX 0 0.005 0.0001 0 0.02 
      
SPI-1 FLT 0.0011 0.1737 0.0224 0 0.0302 
SPI-2 FLT 4.6 4.6 4.6 1 5.76 
SPI-3 FLT 0.0002 0.0039 0.0013 0 0.0045 
SPI-4 FLT 4.9348 4.9348 4.9348 2 8 
SPI-5 FLT 10 10 10 0 36 


















Verification Scenario 2: Standardized SPI Comparison Output 
 Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Min Max Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
SPI-1 MX 0 5 2.878 0.8883 4.8501 
SPI-2 MX 3.411 5 4.433 2.1639 4.2139 
SPI-3 MX 2.384 4.999 3.674 1.1229 3.4422 
SPI-4 MX 0 5 1.724 0.2209 1.3921 
SPI-5 MX 0 5 1.601 0.3281 1.7218 
SPI-6 MX 0 5 0.0974 0 0.4562 
      
SPI-1 FLT 0 5 0.5917 0.0189 2.0034 
SPI-2 FLT 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.2185 1.2185 
SPI-3 FLT 0 5 1.702 0.3660 2.0590 
SPI-4 FLT 1.125 1.125 1.125 0.4610 3.9552 
SPI-5 FLT 3.611 3.611 3.611 3.6111 3.6111 
SPI-6 FLT 0 5 2.382 0.8000 4.0250 




















Verification Scenario 3 Comparison Output 
  Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Variable Min Value Max Value Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
1-MX Logistical 
delay time 
100 290 212 100 310 
2-MX AMTs 
Available* 
35 35  14 35 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7606 4000 13500 
3-MX Percent of AC 
available 
70 100 85 70 100 
 Total AC in 
fleet* 
82 82  50 82 
4-MX Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7602 4000 13500 
 Total MX 
orders 
processed 




425 582 500 300 1000 
 FAA 
occurrences 
1 49 6 0 40 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7606 4000 13500 
6-MX Total MX 
orders 
processed 
100 799 532 100 1200 
 AC dispatched 
w/ MX error 
0 1 0.05 0 2 
       
1-FLT Unstable 
approaches 
6 767 156 0 946 
 Flap 
overspeeds 
0 3 0.54 0 3 
 G exceedances 0 3 0.42 0 3 
 Tail strikes 0 7 3 0 10 
 RPM 
overspeeds 
0 1 0.5 0 3 
 Hard landings 1 5 1.7 0 7 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7606 4000 13500 
132 
 
2-FLT Annual SC 
survey results 
4.6 4.6 4.6 1 5.76 
3-FLT Traffic 
conflicts 
2 14 9 0 18 
 Fleet flight 
time 
4006 13300 7606 4000 13500 
4-FLT Full time Ips* 200 200  100 200 
 Active flight 
students* 
1300 1300  335 1300 
5-FLT Months as an 
IP 
10 10 10 0 12 
6-FLT Event reports 39 108 67 25 150 







0 1 0.12 0 3 
 Unsched MX > 
$10K 
0 3 0.9 0 3 
 NTSB reports 0 1 0.335 0 3 
 Fleet flight 
time 
















Verification Scenario 3: SPI Comparison Output 
 Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Min Max Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
SPI-1 MX 1.7125 4.8741 3.526 1.6667 5.1667 
SPI-2 MX 0.0036 0.0087 0.0048 0 0.00875 
SPI-3 MX 0.8537 1.219 1.035 0.8537 2 
SPI-4 MX 0.0121 0.1888 0.0734 0.0074 0.3 
SPI-5 MX 0.0369 0.1393 0.0697 0 0.26 
SPI-6 MX 0 0.0053 0.0001 0 0.02 
      
SPI-1 FLT 0.0001 0.1799 0.6167 0 0.0302 
SPI-2 FLT 4.6 4.6 4.6 1 5.76 
SPI-3 FLT 0.0002 0.0035 0.0013 0 0.0045 
SPI-4 FLT 6.5 6.5 6.5 2 8 
SPI-5 FLT 10 10 10 0 36 


















Verification Scenario 3: Standardized SPI Comparison Output 
 Model Output Raw Data 
SPI Min Max Mean Lower Limit Higher Limit 
SPI-1 MX 0 5 2.878 0.8883 4.8501 
SPI-2 MX 0 3.973 2.554 2.1639 4.2139 
SPI-3 MX 0.0007 1.595 0.7873 1.1229 3.4422 
SPI-4 MX 0 5 1.724 0.2209 1.3921 
SPI-5 MX 0 5 1.601 0.3281 1.7218 
SPI-6 MX 0 5 0.0974 0 0.4562 
      
SPI-1 FLT 0 5 0.6167 0.0189 2.0034 
SPI-2 FLT 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.2185 1.2185 
SPI-3 FLT 0.0990 4.807 1.676 0.3660 2.0590 
SPI-4 FLT 3.75 3.75 3.75 0.4610 3.9552 
SPI-5 FLT 3.611 3.611 3.611 3.6111 3.6111 
SPI-6 FLT 0 5 2.054 0.8000 4.0250 











C1 Probability Density Distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification 
Scenario 2 
C2 Probability Density Distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 2 
C3 Probability Density Distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in 
Verification Scenario 2 
 
C4 Probability Density Distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification 
Scenario 2 
C5 Probability Density Distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification 
Scenario 3 
C6 Probability Density Distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 3 
C7 Probability Density Distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in 
Verification Scenario 3 
 



















Figure C3. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in 























Figure C7. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in 





Figure C8. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification 
Scenario 3. 
 
